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In today‘s dynamic environment, the need of mapping a wider operational area 
gains significant attention due to the sensitivity of the information needed at real-time to 
the control unit such as in rescue, reconnaissance, and real- time surveillance operations.  
This issue is particularly relevant in military applications. In situations where unattended 
aerial vehicles (UAVs) need to communicate with a control unit, many problems arise 
such as sensor ranges and bandwidth. Distributing multiple ground stations (GSs) 
geographically will reduce the communication bottleneck, and simplify computation of 
deployed information. Interactions between many ground stations, a task initiator (TI), 
and UAVs become paramount, and require a special design to complete the mission 
effectively. Based on knowledge of the economic area, incorporating different auction 
approaches in engineering fields has helped resolve such issues. In this problem, single 
first-price sealed-bid sequential procurement auctions used between the TI and ground 
stations and double first-price sealed-bid sequential procurement auctions possibly with 
(additional) subcontracting (negotiation) from ground stations to UAVs.   
This chapter provides a general overview of the research work, and an overview 





1.1 Multi-UAVs and Data Collection 
The rapid growth of sensor technologies in recent years has enabled scientists to 
solve complicated or difficult problems in many applications, such as the battlefield.  
Various mission tasks, such as target detection, reconnaissance and surveillance, and 
situation awareness include the major area of applications of unattended ground sensors 
(UGS) technologies.  
In the robotic field, scientists follow different approaches when dealing with task 
allocation.  There are three principal approaches to deal with task allocation, namely, 
centralized, distributed, and market-base.  In a centralized approach, the robotic team is 
treated as a single system with many degrees of freedom.  The leader or manager has the 
ability to plan for the entire team that requires the follower to inform the leader with their 
information to enable a manager to carry out actions.  Since the leader has all the 
knowledge about the environment, the leader can perfectly allocate tasks based on this 
knowledge.  The centralized approach produces optimal or near optimal results at the 
expense of high computational overhead and is prone to malfunctioning.   
Overcoming the shortcoming of the centralized approach has encouraged 
scientists to come up with the idea of a distributed system.  In this approach, distributing 
the responsibility of planning to the whole team reduces the communication bottleneck, 
and response to dynamic conditions is faster.   
In general, this system is robust, and no single point of failure can occur. 
Conversely, basing the decision only on local information the results in general are highly 
sub-optimal.  Preserving the advantages of centralized and distributed approaches, 
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scientists migrates ideas from economic areas to overcome the disadvantages of these 
approaches, which led to the birth of market-based coordination.  Market-based 
coordination is based on the free market economic model.  Essentially, the competition 
between members is to maximize their profit. Members under this system usually 
compete to achieve their goals and sometimes negotiation with other team members to 
reach their goals.   
A market-based approach accommodates multiple auctioneers who distribute an 
incoming information load among themselves.  There are three types of auctions for 
acquiring a commodity, namely, English auction, Dutch auction, first-price sealed-bid 
auction, and second-price sealed-bid auction.  In an English auction, an ―ascending‖ 
movement of a potential buyer bids occur until the bidding stops.  The winning bidder 
receives the item at the highest price, which could be less than its maximum valuation; 
however, is not always the case because bidders may tend to overbid, which causes the 
item to exceed its true valuation (Fasli, 2007).   
The Dutch auction is an open, ―descending,‖ bid auction designed to handle 
multiple identical items (usually in a lot).  In this auction, the seller sets an opening price.  
If no bids are made, the price is lowered until a bid is received.  The first bidder wins the 
first option of buying all or part of the lot.  The bidder may lose the item if he/she waits 
too long to enter their bid.   
In a first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB), each bidder submits a sealed bid 
without knowing other bidders' valuation of the item, which reflects a private valuation 
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for the auctioned item.  In this auction, the highest bidder is the winner and pays the 
amount of his/her bid (Fasli, 2007).   
 In a second-price sealed-bid auction, each participant submits a sealed bid.  The 
highest bidder wins the auction, and only pays the price of the second highest bid.  
Therefore, it is the bidder‘s advantage to bid his/her true valuation of the item.   
A double auction is an environment where multiple buyers and sellers participate 
to trade a commodity.  In this environment, each buyer and seller submits a bid 
representing his/her offer to sell or buy the auctioned commodity.  Then, submitted bids 
are matched, and afterwards the auction is cleared.  Double auction, in this context, is a 
two-sided auction; one side represents a centralized approach while the other side 
represents a distributed approach, allowing the market to compute the information in an 
efficient manner while providing quick responses.   
As in battlefields, providing quick responses is a key factor when transmitting 
data back and forward to the TI.  A TI could also be a control room or an agent with the 
ability to initiate tasks.  Transmitting data are also a challenge when connectivity is an 
issue or when there are limited communication ranges such as unmanned ground sensors 
(UGSs) and large distances between UGSs and the TI.  However, task allocation through 
multiple ground stations (GSs) is more cost effective than single GSs for mapping wider 
areas and acquiring better robustness.   
To improve reliability, performance, and the cost of task allocation, logically one 
should consider a market-based coordination mechanism such as a free market economic 
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model, which provides better results for optimizing distance data delivery from multiple 
UGSs.  
Multiple GSs, in this context, will provide an excellent opportunity to overcome 
communication problems or sensor range limitations by forming a chain of 
communication to receive information from a further distance, reduce communication 
bottleneck, provide relief or reduce computation complexity for the control center (Moore 
et al., 2005).  
When using double auction, the TI, GSs, and UAVs formulate layers of 
communications that provide quick responses in a robust environment to benefit from the 
market-based mechanism. 
 
1.2  Dissertation Scope 
The focus of this research is two-fold: 
1. The coordination problem of task initiator (TI), ground stations (GSs) and a team 
of UAVs that is employed to frequently visit a set of remote UGSs, collect data 
from them, and return to the ground station to deliver the collected data.  As 
mentioned earlier, the importance of time as a factor can be realized when GSs 
receive this data.  A time constraint on data delivery is one of the concerns of this 
dissertation.  The deadline limit on data delivery time should not exceed a specific 
time in order to validate the accuracy of the data.  In particular, to achieve any 
task, the time between two successive tasks should not exceed a certain deadline 
time.  This constraint is imposed by the nature of the UGS applications (as in 
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target detection and situation awareness), in which late-delivered data will lose its 
sensitive value and may not be useful anymore and may result in hazardous 
situations, and   
2. The problem of assigning tasks when the environment has multiple GSs and 
multiple UAVs with full degree of freedom.   
UAVs are responsible for accomplishing tasks such as tracking enemy targets in 
battlefields or gathering information from UGS.  In these scenarios, the UAVs must 
coordinate their actions with GSs, usually through communication, in order to achieve 
their goals.  The UAVs must make independent decisions based on their perception of the 
environment, and act in a manner that optimize the global utility.   
Resources (utilities) or energy consumption is a constraint that the coordination 
system should satisfy.  Optimizing the average distance traveled of performing any task 
should be part of the coordination methods.  Under these conditions, this problem 
formulated as a continuous and time constrained version of the multi- traveling salesmen 
problem (MTSP).   
 Recent studies showed that multi-agent systems operating in dynamic 
environments such as surveillance, reconnaissance, and battlefields are highly prone to 
failures of many kinds, and it is crucial that the coordination method that deals with such 
kind of environment be robust to these failures (Ajorlou et al., 2007 and Dias et al., 
2004).   
Introducing the distributed coordination system helps to understand operating in 
this type an environment.  Market based coordination is one mechanism that have an 
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effective usage in an environment in which frequent auctioning, time limited contracts, 
and time-dependent prices ensure robustness in the face of loss of team members and 
failures of individuals (Dias et al., 2004).   
Stentz and Dias (2003) in TraderBots market-based coordination approach cited 
the work of (Smith, 1980) in Contract Net Protocol, the implementation of contract net 
protocol by (Sandholm, 1993), and an extension of it by (Sandholm and Lesser, 1995).  
These concepts were used to control different dynamic environment systems.  Stentz and 
Dias (1999) proposed a market-based approach for multi-robot coordination, which aims 
to exploit the desirable properties of both distributed and centralized approaches.  In 
order to take advantage of such approaches, (Dias et al., 2004) proposed a distributed task 
allocation protocol that uses the concepts of cost, revenue, and profit that efficiently 
distribute available tasks among team members through a sequence of multiple different 
auctions.  In this environment, each agent is self- interested in maximizing their personal 
profit, which can lead to a near global optimal plan for the entire team provided the costs 
and price functions are well defined.  Generally, in this kind of task allocation, the cost of 
the task will determine its priority among other tasks.  Adding a new task will be 
constrained to the due time of other tasks on the agent‘s current plan.  So the lower the 
cost, the more demand needed to perform it.  It is clear that the task‘s cost is not always 
the main factor.  In some situations, a task will be given higher priority even though it has 
a high execution cost compared to other tasks due to the sensitivity of task‘s information 
at the time.   
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Negotiation between UAVs after clearing the auction will improve system 
efficiency by reducing the cost to participating agents.  Because of the agents‘ interest, 
they will try to maximize their profit and reduce their cost.  By design, the auction can 
accommodate a situation where an agent auctioned a task earlier even when the agent was 
not bidding during the auction time because this agent is deemed fittest to perform the 
task.  In a system-optimized model, different negotiations produce the same result.  
Frequent auctioning will accommodate the recovery of task(s) timed out due to agent 
failure or death; reallocating these tasks to new agents will cause the system to be robust 
and guarantee the delivery of all auctioned tasks.   
 
1.3  Overview of Chapters 
Chapter 2 gives a general overview of the basic concepts in market-based 
coordination including auction mechanisms, types, and approaches.  It also provides a 
literature review.  Chapter 3 focuses on the problem formulation and methodology. 
Particular emphasis is on different auction structures.  Issues related to cost estimation 
and robustness are also discussed.  Presented in Chapter 4 are the simulation results, and 
the performance of the double auction.  The dissertation concludes with Chapter 5, which 





2.1  Relevant Work 
Multi-robot coordination has received much attention in the last few decades.  
This is due to the demand for automation in application domains where multiple robots 
can accomplish the same tasks more efficiently than a single robot.  With a team of 
coordinated robots, tasks achievement is faster, safer, better than a single robot, and can 
accomplish operations that a single robot cannot execute alone (Lemair et al., 2004).  
Accordingly, coordinating multiple robots to complete a task cooperatively is a difficult 
problem that has attracted much attention from the robotics research community.  Based 
on the manner in which team members interact, multi-robot coordination mechanisms can 
be categorized into two groups: intentional swarm type cooperation.  Deneubourg, et al., 
(1991) mentioned that in swarm-type robotic systems, numerous homogeneous 
autonomous robots interact directly by exchanging their information with one another or 
by acting on their environment; this collective activity may produce coordinated 
behavior.  In contrast to this, there is an intentional coordination, in which agents 
negotiate explicitly and exchange task related information.  The motivation behind this 
kind of coordination is to satisfy mutual interest.   
Lemair et al., (2004) mentioned that the potential applications of this kind of 
coordination range from mapping missions of buildings or in a natural environment, 
rescue or intervention missions in hazardous areas to planetary explorat ion or deployment 
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of equipment without human intervention.  A system supported with several robots to 
perform a given mission should be flexible enough to allow robots to allocate tasks to 
each other and build their plans accordingly to complete the mission.  They should also 
be able to modify the allocation dynamically and consequently to their plans to adapt to 
changes in their environment or to new requests issued by the operator.  However, the 
system must also satisfy the limited constraints on energy resources and communication 
ranges.   
In their TraderBots, (Dias et al., 2004) mentioned that multi-agent systems 
operating in dynamic environments such as battlefields must accommodate many kinds 
of failures, frequent dynamical changes, and uncertain or imperfect information.  
Therefore, it is crucial that any kind of coordination methods applied for multi-agent 
systems be able to function well under such conditions.  Market based coordination was 
derived from a category of intentional coordination mechanisms, and is a promising 
method for handling these conditions.  Frequent auctioning, time limited contracts, and 
time-dependent prices ensure robustness in the loss of team members and individual 
failures, which also enable the team to get by with uncertainty and online tasks 
introduced over time (Dias et al., 2004, and 2005).  The distributed nature of market-
based coordination enables the team to rely on local knowledge so they can respond 
quick and fast to dynamic changes within their environment without the need of a central 
planner.  Since information is decomposed into bids, the market-based coordination 
systems can communicate efficiently and compute efficiently due to the parallelism.   
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During the last two decades, coordination mechanisms for multi-robot task 
allocation have been developed that are based on market-base coordination.  The M+ 
(Botelho and Alami, 1999) architecture, based on a greedy algorithm, was the first 
market-based approach to multi- robot task allocation.  The MURDOCH (Gerkey and 
Mataric, 2002), as a completely distributed system, offers a distributed approximation to 
a global optimum of resource usage, which is equivalent to an instantaneous greedy 
scheduler.  An online task assignment algorithm also assigns a newly created task to the 
fittest available robot (Gerkey and Mataric, 2004).  TraderBots models (Dias et al., 2004) 
represent a multi-robot team as an economy of self- interested agents that try to maximize 
their individual profits.  In these models, reallocating tasks allow for solution 
improvements over initial assignments, and for adapting task assignments as new 
information is ascertained.   
In this dynamic environment, agents who have the ability of planning for 
themselves and negotiating may do so by swapping some tasks (as self- interested agents).  
This redistribution of tasks and resources simultaneously at the end result in lower cost 
solutions, which imply some profit, and therefore will improve efficiency.  Given 
appropriate costs and revenue functions, this method can lead to a near globally optimal 
allocation.  Constrained tasks will not be dealt with in TraderBots where interrelated 
costs among the tasks are considered.  Hoplites (Karla et al., 2005) seem to be the first 
market based approach to constrained task execution.  In Hoplites, passive coordination 
produces locally developed solutions since agents frequently exchange information of 
their intended actions and locally select their actions.  In a situation where there is a 
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constraint violation, agents actively propose and bid on joint plans to resolve the 
constraint.  The performance of Hoplites is validated in perimeter sweeping (Karla et al., 
2005) and, more recently, in constrained exploration (Karla et al., 2006), during 
exploration of a hazardous area, robots are restricted to remain in communication with 
the base station directly or through a chain of teammates.  Lemaire et al. (2004) put soft 
time constraints on subtasks of a complex task to synchronize subtask execution.  To 
define the cost of a plan for tasks, needed are the sum of the distance cost of the plan and 
a cost term corresponding to the quality of the time-constraint satisfaction.  Agents, 
therefore, will try to reduce the deviation from the expected execution time while trading 
tasks. 
The price of a task determines the cost the auctioneer will pay an agent that 
accomplishes the task.  Using time-varying prices, the auctioneer announces higher prices 
for tasks that have become more important.  Therefore, bids reflect not only the agents' 
costs but also the importance of the tasks.   
 
2.2  Market-based Coordination 
This section briefly explains the basic concepts of market-based coordination 
mechanisms.   
2.2.1  Overview 
In market-based coordination methods, participants form an economy that 
allocates tasks to members through auctions.  Normally, a user or team members that 
have task creation capability (Dias, et al., 2005) generate tasks.  An auctioneer offers all 
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its available tasks to other agents in its environment, collects their bids, evaluates the 
collected bids, and assigns some or all of its tasks to them.  As discussed in the previous 
section, some market-based coordination systems allow reassignment of a task.  This 
means that an agent in charge of performing a task have the ability to rese ll that task to 
another agent, e.g., TraderBots (Dias et al., 2004), M+ (Botelho and Alami,1999), the 
system presented in (Ajorlou et al., 2007), and Sandholm's implementation of the contract 
net protocol (Sandholm, 1993).  In such systems, any team member can negotiate with 
teammates to improve their personal profit as a self- interested agent.  An agent who 
offered a task may submit a bid on it.  A submitted bid in this context represents the cost 
to the agent for performing the offered task.  The global objective of the application and 
resource consumption are two main factors in bid valuation.  By assigning the tasks to 
team members through a bidding process, the auctioneer tries to lower the overall team 
cost by allocating the tasks to team members with lower costs.   
2.2.2  Instantaneous Assignment (IA) vs. Time-extended Assignment (TA) 
Gerkey and Mataric (2002) categorized multi-robot task allocation mechanisms 
based on instantaneous assignment (IA) and time extended assignment (TA).  In IA, 
robots do not have the ability to plan for their future activities, which mean the available 
information concerning the robots, the tasks, and the environment permits only an 
instantaneous allocation of tasks to robots, with no planning for future allocations.  
Therefore, the agents can only buy or sell one task at a time, which indicates that there is 
no room for parallelism.  This type of allocation mechanism is useful for the applications 
in which tasks are introduced to the system online such as MURDOCH (Gerkey and 
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Mataric 2002), first-price auctions (Dias et al., 2003), and dynamic role assignment 
(Gerkey and Mataric, 2004).   
In TA, agents have more information about the environment, such as the set of all 
tasks that needs an assignment, or a model of how tasks are expected to arrive over time.  
In this type of assignment, agents are allowed to make plans for the future by accepting 
more than one task at a time.   
2.2.3  Auction Mechanisms 
This section describes various types of auctions.  In particular, how auctions differ 
and how auctioneers function within them.   
2.2.3.1 Procurement Auction 
A procurement auction, also called reverse auction, is a type of auction in which 
the role of the buyer and seller are reversed.  The primary objective here is to drive 
purchase prices downward.  In this kind of auction, sellers compete to obtain business.  In 
a procurement auction, a buyer puts up a request to purchase a particular item.  Multiple 
sellers bid to sell the requested item and the winner of the auction is the se ller who offers 
the lowest price (www.wordiq.com/definition/Procurement_auction).  In a procurement 
auction, the bidders seek a higher clearing price, and the auctioneer seeks a lower one.   
2.2.3.2 Double Auction 
Dynamic pricing mechanisms, and especially auctions with multiple buyers and 
sellers, are becoming popular in electronic commerce.  ―Double auction‖ refers to a 
market system where multiple buyers and sellers submit their bids for standardized units 
of well-defined items or securities by stating how much and at what price they will trade.  
15 
In double auction, each trader can express the subjective preference for the traded goods 
by using a utility function.  Thus, properly defining the utility for representing each 
trader's preference is an important issue for research on double auction.  Double auctions 
occur in an environment that has one commodity in the market with multiple buyers and 
sellers each submitting a single bid to buy or sell one unit of the commodity.  According 
to (Fasli, 2007) the general process is as follows: 
 Both buyer and sellers submit their bids.  
 Bids rank from highest to lowest to generate demand and supply profiles.  
 From the profiles, the maximum quantity exchanged can be determined by 
matching selling offers with demands bids. 
 The transaction price is set and the market clears.   
In this auction, each GS will sell only one task at a time, and any UAV will bid 
for only one task at a time.  Each bidder has a private utility value for the item, which 
represents its real cost to perform such a task.  The utility value from buyers‘, 
(respectively, sellers‘) point of view is the most (respectively, least) prices that they are 
willing to pay to buy (respectively, sell) the task.  Although all market agents are self-
interested, agents formulate their bids is based on the truthful value of the item.   
A double auction could be either periodic or continuous.  In a continuous double 
auction, buyers and sellers are matched immediately on detection of compatible bids, 
while in periodic double auction bids are collected over a specified period of time after 
which the market will be cleared.   
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2.2.3.3 Combinatorial Auction 
A combinatorial auction is one where buyers and sellers have preferences on 
packages or bundles of commodities rather than only on one particular commodity at 
time.  In this auction, bids are considered for combinations of different commodities.  
Consider a case where a set S of n tasks offered to the team members.  Each agent 
calculates the cost of performing each subset of S, and submits a bid on that subset.  After 
receiving all bids, the auctioneer evaluates them, and finds the partition of S with 
minimum cost.  Bid calculation and winner determination are NP hard, which makes the 
combinatorial auctions intractable. 
2.2.3.4  Parallel Auction  
In parallel auctions, a set S of n tasks offered to the team members.  Each agent 
calculates the cost of performing any of the offered tasks individually and submits a bid.  
The auctioneer then assigns each task to the agent that has submitted the lowest bid. 
Parallel auctions do not account for the dependencies among the tasks.   
2.2.3.5  Sequential Auction 
In sequential auctions, the set S of n tasks assigned through a sequence of n 
auctions, where only one task is sold in each auction.  During each auction, each agent 
computes the cost of adding each unsold task to its current plan.  Then, the task with the 
lowest cost is assigned to a corresponding bidder.  Clearly, submitting bids for all the 
tasks offered will create communication complexity; but, since only one task is assigned 
during each auction cycle, it is in the best interest of each bidder to submit a bid only for 
the task that cost less among all auctioned tasks.  This will have an impact of reducing the 
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communication bottleneck and increase the bidder‘s chance of winning the auctioned 
task.   
Calculating marginal cost (the cost of adding a new task to the current plan) is NP 
hard in the MTSP case since it requires re-planning for the new set of tasks.  In the 
heuristic used by (Ajorlou et al., 2007), a new task will be inserted between each two 
successive tasks into the agent plan to find the minimum cost of the new generated plan, 
which is the current plan.  The difference between the current plan and the old one is the 
cost of performing the new task.   
2.2.4  Auction Types 
In a single attribute or a one-side auction, agents negotiate over one item, which is 
available by itself as a whole and not in combination.  The negotiation has one 
dimension, usually price, and the relationship between buyers and sellers takes the form 
of one-to-one, one-to-many or many-to-many relationships.   
2.2.4.1  Ascending-bid Auction (English Auction) 
The English auction is the most common type of auction where the winning 
bidder receives the item at the highest price.  The auction uses upward or ―ascending‖ 
movement of potential buyer bids until the bidding stops.  Bids may be oral, signaled, 
written or by third-party proxy in which one item or groups of items can be auctioned.  
Auction periods vary but are generally short.  Items are frequently displayed to potential 
bidders prior to the auction with the reserve prices cited. E-Bay is a good e-commerce 
application of this type auction.   
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2.2.4.2  Descending-bid Auction (Dutch Auction) 
The Dutch auction is an open, ―descending‖ bid auction designed to handle 
multiple, identical items (usually in a lot).  In this type auction, the seller sets an opening 
price.  If no bids are made, the price is lowered until a bid is received.  This first bidder 
wins the first option of buying all or a part of the lot.  Other bidders have an opportunity 
to buy once the demand at that price is exhausted.  Additional bidders may bid a lower 
price. This cycle continues until the lot is gone.   
2.2.4.3  First-price Sealed-bid Auction  
In a first price sealed bid auction (FPSB), each bidder submits a sealed bid that 
reflects its private valuation for the auctioned item without knowing other bidders‘ 
valuations of the item.  In this auction, the highest bidder is the winner and pays the 
amount of his/her bid.  There are two distinctive phases (Fasli, M. 2007): 
1. The bidder phase in which participants submit their bids. 
2. The resolution phase in which the bids are opened and the winner is determined. 
2.2.4.4  Second-price Sealed-bid Auction (Vickery Auction) 
The second-price sealed-bid auction was named after William Vickery, a 1996 
Nobel Prize recipient (Economics).  In this type auction, each participant submits a sealed 
bid.  The highest bidder wins the auction but only pays the price of the second highest 
bid.  This auction fosters a bid strategy that reflects the buyer‘s true valuation of the item.  
The Vickery approach gives all competing buyers an incentive to disclose their true best 
price since they can safely bid a price that would yield zero profit.  The process can be 
used in a reverse auction method with the cheapest price winning but paying the second 
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lowest bid price. 
2.2.5  Auction Approaches 
Normally, targets are scattered in the environment and the number of UAVs may 
be more or less than the number of targets available.  In either case, an efficient task 
allocation method is needed for assigning UAVs to the targets.  An efficient task 
allocation strategy should complete the mission (that is, delivering the target information 
to the GSs) in minimum time by direct assignment from the GSs or through negotiation 
with other UAVs in communication range.  The classical solution for a task allocation 
problem would be to apply a centralized task allocation algorithm that generates the 
necessary commands for UAVs.  However, centralized task allocations have well known 
limitations.  Hence, there is a necessity to develop a decentralized task allocation 
algorithm.  Here, briefly discussed are the concepts of centralized and distributed task 
allocation to assign tasks to UAVs. 
2.2.5.1  Centralized Approaches 
With centralized approaches, one agent (the leader) is responsible for planning for 
the entire team, while simultaneously taking into account the environment and the 
interactions of all team members at all times.  All agents report to the leader and execute 
the plan.  Although the centralized approach generates an optimal solution under the 
assumption that the information from the agents is available, it is intractable for a team of 
UAVs due to the complexity of operations (Karla et al., 2006, Sariel et al., 2006).  
Coordinating more than a few agents in the centralized approach causes a heavy 
communication load, and a problem with the bandwidth due to restrictions on the 
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network.  This approach is slow to incorporate new environmental information since new 
information must be sent back to the planner who re-computes the entire team‘s plan, 
usually at significant computational expense.  Finally, a centralized approach does not 
allow a quick adaptation to change and tends to be brittle to failure.  Primarily, 
centralized approaches have been used loosely in coordinated systems for task allocation 
(Sariel et al., 2006).  Thus, centralized approaches are best suited for applications where 
teams are small and the environment is static or global state information is easily 
available.   
2.2.5.2  Distributed Approaches 
In a distributed approach, agents act independently and make decisions with local 
information about their state and their environment.  For example, the UAV work with 
the ground stations or the central units such as TI to conduct their own plans based on 
available information.  Here the role of the central control or ground station is for 
auctioning the task to the agents, evaluating received bids and awarding the winner agent.  
This approach tends to be more robust to failure, allowing for greater flexibility and 
tractability, and efficient for computation and communication.  However, the solution 
remains sub-optimal.  To emphasize the benefits of centralized approaches in distributed 
systems, market-based approaches have been designed to centrally plan over small 
subsets of the team where time and resources permit (Dias et al., 2004 and 2003).  
In market-based frameworks, agents model an economy of self- interested 
individuals that buy and sell tasks and resources to maximize personal profit (Dias et al., 
2005).  This redistribution of tasks and resources simultaneously results in lower cost 
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solutions for the team.  Most of the distributed task allocations use an explicit 
communication message, which means that agents make decisions based on inter-agent 
communications transmitted at different times.  This characteristic makes the algorithms 
more efficient, and with a higher level of fault tolerance than a centralized approach due 
to its distributed nature. 
Negotiation over the distributed system generates a step-wise improvement.  
Negotiation techniques based on market rules (i.e., market-based approaches) fall within 
the distributed algorithms that make use of explicit communication.  These techniques 
have received significant attention (Dias et al., 2006) since they offer a good compromise 
between communication requirements and the quality of the allocation.  
2.2.5.3  Market-based Approaches 
A task allocation algorithm can be a method of distributing common resources.  
Humans have dealt with similar problems for thousands of years with increasingly 
sophisticated market economies in which the individual pursuit of profit leads to the 
redistribution of resources and an efficient production of output.  Therefore, market based 
approaches make use of the principles of the market economy and apply them to multi-
agent coordination.  This idea started with the Contract Net Protocol or CNP (Smith, 
1980), which allocates tasks through negotiation of contracts.  In this virtual economy, 
agents are traders, tasks are traded commodities, and virtual money acts as currency.  
Agents compete, despite being teammates in reality, to win tasks by part icipating in 
auctions that produce efficient distributions based on specified preferences.  When the 
system is designed appropriately, each agent acts to maximize its individual profit, and 
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simultaneously improves the efficiency of the team.  This is the foundation of the success 
of the market-based approach; one engineers the costs, revenues, and auction 
mechanisms in such a way that individual self- interest leads to global efficient solutions.   
Generally, a multi-agent coordination approach is a market-based approach if it 
satisfies the following requirements (Dias et al., 2006): 
 The team is given a number of tasks that are achievable by individuals or sub-
teams.  To execute these tasks, the team has at its disposal a limited set of 
resources (robot capacities) that the team distributes among its members.   
 A global objective quantifies the system designer‘s preferences for all possible 
solutions.   
 An individual utility function specified for each agent quantifies that agent‘s 
preferences for its individual resource usage and contributions towards the 
team objective.  Evaluating this function cannot require global or perfect 
information about the state of the team or team objective.   
 A mapping is defined between the team objective function and individual or 
sub-team utilities.  This mapping addresses how the individual production and 
consumption of resources and individuals‘ advancement of the team objective 
affect the overall solution.   
 Resources and individual or sub-team objectives can be redistributed using a 
mechanism such as an auction.   
The core of market-based approach can be observed from where the auction 
mechanism is.  This mechanism can be divided in two phases, namely, a bidding phase 
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and the winner determination phase.  In the former, tasks are evaluated using a utility 
function, which does not require the use of global information.  In the latter phase, after 
receiving the different bids, a task awarding mechanism is applied in order to choose the 
most suitable agent for the task under auction.  Moreover, these two phases consider the 
participation of two roles: auctioneer and bidders.  The bidding phase starts with either TI 
or GS offering a task to the rest of the bidders.  After receiving the announcement, they 
should reply with their bids based on their capacity to execute that task (utility function).  
The bidding phase is finish when the auctioneer receives all the bids.  Next, the winner 
determination phase starts.  The auctioneer applies a mechanism that awards the task to 
one of the bidders.  Finally, the winner will add the task to his/her execution list.  Market-
based task allocation algorithms do not limit the number of auctioneers and more than 
one can operate at the same time.  The main concepts that define a task allocation 
mechanism based on auctions are: global objective, utility function, and task awarding 
mechanism.   
The global objective defines the team‘s goal to be optimized by coordinating all 
agents.  Different global objective functions can be considered (Tovey et al., 2005) 
described the sum of the utilities, the maximum of all the utilities, and the average of the 
utilities.  The sum of utilities is used in scenarios where it is important to minimize the 
total energy consumed by the team of agents.  The maximum of all the utilities is used in 
scenarios where it is fundamental to minimize the time needed to execute all tasks.  Both 
objectives have been used in multi-agent exploration scenarios.  On the other hand, the 
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average of the utilities used in search-and-rescue scenarios where it is important to 
minimize how long on average it takes to execute a task.   
The utility function is used to evaluate tasks and calculate bids.  This function is 
composed of the reward and cost functions as indicated in Chapter 3.  The reward 
function indicates the benefit of executing a task, and the cost function gives an estimate 
of the effort to accomplish the same task.   
The most common task awarding mechanism is to allocate a task to the agent with 
the highest utility or lowest cost considering all received bids.  As mentioned before, 
there is a connection between the individual utility function, the task awarding 
mechanism and the global objective.  The system designer‘s responsibility is to choose a 
utility function, and an awarding mechanism that leads to an efficient global solution.  
Tovey et al., 2005 explained the systematic methods for deriving appropriate utility 
functions and awarding mechanisms for each of the global objectives.   
Finally, other properties that allow for characterization of a market-based task 
allocation algorithm are described: 
 Multiple Robot Single Task (MRST) algorithms and Multiple Robots Multiple 
Tasks (MRMT) algorithms: MRST algorithms do not make use of local 
execution plans, and therefore, they are suited for applications where task 
costs may change through time.  However, the allocations are usually less 
efficient allocations than MRMT algorithms, which use local plans to increase 
the information used in the bid calculation.  It can be said that MRST and 
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MRMT algorithms have a capacity constraint equal to one and greater than 
one respectively (Koenig et al., 2007).   
 With and without reallocations: when reallocations are not considered, the 
same robots that initially allocated tasks execute tasks.  On the other hand, 
when a task allocation algorithm considers reallocations, it means that in order 
to increase the efficiency of the final allocation, a robot could re-announce its 
already allocated task or tasks.   
 Combinatorial or single- item auctions: in most of the task allocation 
algorithms, each auction process only considers a single task.  In 
combinatorial auctions, each auction can involve more than one task.  
Therefore, bids are calculated for bundles of tasks (Zheng et al., 2007).   
 Coordinated or loosely coupled tasks: when the execution of tasks is 
completely independent from the rest, this is termed loosely coupled.  
However, if the execution of tasks depends on others, tasks are coordinated. 
This fact should be taken into account in the task allocation algorithm in order 
to avoid execution deadlocks.   
 Sequential and parallel auctions: when only one auction runs at a time, the 
task allocation algorithm is sequential.  On the other hand, if more than one 
auction can be performed simultaneously, they are executed in parallel.  When 
parallel auctions are used, the system‘s designer must be aware of the biding 
process since bids used in one auction process are no longer valid due to the 
result of another parallel auction.   
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2.2.5.3.1 M+ Approach - M+ (Botelho and Alami, 1999) could be, the first distributed 
market-based system defined within a general architecture for the cooperation among 
multiple robots.  In this system, when a robot calculates the cost of a task, it considers 
one task ahead for each robot that allowed, whenever possible, an overlapping between 
the execution of the current task for a robot and the planning and task allocation of the 
next one, which increases the efficiency of the solution.  In order to synchronize subtask 
execution, the M+ approach imposes soft time constraints on subtasks for a complex task.  
Costs are also associated with the quality of time-constraint satisfaction.  In a multi-robot 
context, robots negotiate with one another to adapt its plan incrementally.  Since each 
task has a different execution time, for future negotiations, agents optimize deviation for 
different execution times.  Along the way, tasks can be moved from one UAV (agent) to 
another through negotiation.   
2.2.5.3.2 MURDOCH Approach - MURDOCH is a general task allocation system based 
on principled, resource centric, published/subscribe communication model that makes 
extensive use of explicit inter-robot communication (Gerkey and Mataric, 2002).  
Therefore, Murdoch is a MRST task allocation algorithm, in which robots do not take 
part in auctions while they are executing a task.  Therefore, a new task announced 
dynamically will be allocated to idle robots.  If all robots are executing a task; the task is 
either discarded or re-announced after a period.  Therefore, Murdoch appears as a version 
of Contract Net Protocol (CNP) of Smith (1980), which uses simple auctions to allocate 
tasks.  Murdoch‘s approach is considered the first proven application of auction methods 
for the coordination of physical multi-robot systems that applied multiple tasks.   
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2.2.5.3.3  TraderBots Approach - TraderBots is price-based approach in which robots are 
considered as self- interested agents and the team of robots as an economy.  Its goal is to 
complete tasks successfully while minimizing overall costs.  The individual goal for each 
robot is to maximize its individual profit, which at the end will contribute to overall good.  
Robots have the ability to make plans and perform task assignment.  Re-assignment is 
allowable and dependencies are taken into account.   
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CHAPTER 3 
PROBLEM FORMULATION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1  Problem Formulation 
In this research environment, multiple buyers and sellers exchange a single item 
at a time; the TI creates n sensor-visit tasks corresponding to n random UGSs and assigns 
them to GSs via auctioning.  The GSs (and later on the UAVs) calculate the incremental 
cost for specific tasks and submit their sell (respectively, buy) bids to the TI 
(respectively, GS).  The market system consists of multiple buyers and sellers that submit 
their bids for standardized units of well-defined items by stating the amount and the price 
they will trade, referred to as a ―double auction.‖  Each bidder expresses its subjective 
preference for the traded item using a utility function, which represents its estimate of its 
real cost to perform such a task.   
 Consider a set of n UGSs scattered in a remote area.  A team of m UAVs 
designated to frequently visit these sensors collect their data and deliver it to the ground 
stations (GSs).  Therefore, the objective of the coordination problem is to apply double 
auctions to reduce the overall cost while satisfying time constraints.  The TI is located at 
the origin of a 3D-space bounded by the following ranges: 
 -2CommUAVMax ≤ x ≤ 2CommUAVMax 
 -2CommUAVMax≤ y ≤ 2CommUAVMax, and 
 0 ≤ z ≤ 2CommUAVMax,  
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where,  CommUAVMax is the maximum communication radius admissible by a UAV.  The TI 
computes the cost and the deadline for each task as indicated by Equations (3.1) and 
(3.2). 
 TITaskCost(t) = P0(1+up*t/tH) (3.1) 
 TItH(TK) = 2*||Tk – TI||2/
i
UAV _Speed + t (3.2) 
where, t is the time elapsed between the times the task is created until the time the task is re-
auctioned, up is a parameter to determine the increment in the price, tH is the deadline time for 
the task (TK) to be received by the auctioneer, and 
i
UAV _Speed is the speed of the 
i
UAV , 
as also used in Equation (3.3).  
P0= 2*(|| Tk – TI||2*(udc + utcost/
i
UAV _Speed) ) (3.3) 
Ideally, as soon as a task is created it is auctioned immediately to the GSs.  The TI 
broadcasts its tasks one at a time.  Each GS broadcasts the announced task to the UAVs in its 
connectivity range and submits its sell bid paired with the minimum buy bid received from 
the UAVs to the TI.  The TI ranks all received bids in descending order from maximum to 
minimum to generate a supply and demand profile.  Then, the TI evaluates its received bids 
and assigns the task to the GS with the minimum sell bid, which is paired with a UAV‘s 
minimum buy bid.  The GS that was paired with the winner UAV (
iWin
UAV ) prior to ranking the 
bids (denoted by 
jUAV
GS ) will tell 
iWin
UAV  to execute the task.  The 
jUAV
GS  will receive profit equal 
to the difference between its bid price and the announced winner GSs (denoted by
jWin
GS ) bid 
price.  The winner UAV (
iWin
UAV ), and the winner GS (
jWin
GS ) will receive the profit calculated 
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using Equation (3.4).   
ProfitGSi = ProfitUAV = 0.5*((
jWin
GS _SBid - 
iWin




GS _SBid - 
jWin
GS _SBid)) (3.4) 
If at any time a UAV does not deliver the task to the original GS, a penalty is incurred 
that reduces its profit as in Equation (3.5).   
Penalty =  0.5*(
jUAV
GS _SBid - 
jWin
GS _SBid) (3.5) 
Further, the UAVs submit bids reflecting the incremental cost of the data-delivery task, 
and the GS allocates the task to the UAV submitting the minimum bid.  This procedure is 
repeated until all tasks are sold.  However, allocation of data delivery tasks to UAVs 
must continue to optimize the overall distance traveled and to satisfy the deadline time 





i 1,1  (3.6) 
Let Tji be the ith data delivery time for the j
th
 sensor, tH be the deadline time for data 
deliveries for any sensor, and n be the number of unattended ground sensors.  In this case, 
we are dealing with a continuous task allocation mechanism that satisfies the constraint 
on data delivery time while optimizing the team‘s average distance traveled per data 
delivery.   
To obtain a solution, we describe sensor-visit tasks.  Each sensor-visit task 
consists of visiting a sensor, collecting its data, and returning to the GS to deliver the 
collected data.  A task created or renewed is the task creation time.  The data delivery 
time for a task is also the time passed from the task's creation time to the time the TI 
receives the task's data.  By using the task creations and data delivery times, the problem 
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statement reformulated as a problem of continuously allocating sensor-visit tasks to the 
UAVs so the data delivery times of all sensor-visit tasks remain lower than tH.   
 
3.2  Methodology 
In this dynamic research environment, off- line methods are not appropriate 
because new UGSs maybe added to or removed from the mission.  Further, the team of 
UAVs is prone to changes since we may lose some UAVs due to communication failure 
or death, and a UAV maybe added to the mission at any time.  Additionally, continuously 
updating task allocations will produce more allocations that are efficient because 
allocations depend on the UAVs‘ positions when tasks are refreshed, and efficient 
allocations may change from round to round.  Therefore, in this auction, the following 
assumptions are considered: 
1. Tasks are created every two seconds.   
2. Since the auction happen so quickly, UAVs wait until all tasks are auctioned before 
they start moving towards their tasks; otherwise, they hover around the GSs they 
communicate with.   
3. The space is constrained to  
 -2CommUAVMax  ≤  x  ≤  2CommUAVMax,  
 - 2CommUAVMax ≤ y ≤  2 CommUAVMax, and  
 0 ≤  z  ≤ 2CommUAVMax.   
4. Three GSs are scattered around the TI and communicate with one another.   
32 
5. A UAV‘s tasks are not delivered unless that UAV communicates with the GS it is 
supposed to deliver the tasks to.   
A market-based approach uses communication efficiently since the UAVs 
compress information into bids.  The role of the TI is limited to task creation and to 
holding auctions as well as matching sell bids with buy bids.  In a double auction, each 
bidder has a private utility value for an item, which represents its real cost to perform 
such a task.  In dealing with a minimization problem, we are trying to find a way to 
reduce the overall cost.  Therefore, in this auction, the TI broadcasts its tasks one at a 
time, each GS broadcasts the announced task to UAVs in its connectivity range and 
submits its sell bid, paired with the minimum buy bid received from the UAVs, to the TI.  
GSs use the TI‘s reservation price to generate their own price for the auctioned task, 
which is based on their linear distance to the auctioned task and the time needed for the 
task to be executed by a prospective UAV, which is also based on its known speed.   
The UAV inserts its awarded task into its current plan where the task remains 
until the UAV delivers the corresponding data to the GS.  When a GS receives the task's 
data, the TI‘s information will be updated accordingly.  Transaction determinations and 
winners (buyers and sellers) who are going to transact in the double auction are 
completely based on the bid price subject to the following constraints: 
 The bid price must be less than or equal to the announced reservation price,  
 A UAV that has a task from a previous auction cycle may submit a new buy bid if 
and only if executing the current bid will not make any previous won tasks in his 
task list time out.   
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The GS places a bid equal to the 
j
GS Cost for this task if and only if the constraint prescribed 
by Equation (3.7) is met. 
j
GS Cost(Tk) ≤ TITaskCost (Tk) (3.7) 
Each GS auctions the task to all UAVs in its communication range.  In other words, if the 
constraint prescribed by Equation (3.8) is met, a UAV qualifies to place a bid for that task 
from that GS. 
||UAV – GS||2 ≤ CSUAV-GS*(CommUAV + CommGS) (3.8) 
where CSUAV-GS, in [0, 1], is the communication strength between the UAV and GS, 
CommUAV is the communication radius of the UAV, and CommGS is the communication 
radius of the GS. 
 
3.3  Market-based Coordination Framework 
UAVs, GSs and the TI trade tasks continuously via double auctions.  The TI 
creates some tasks for bidding by the GSs.  At this point, each GS starts broadcasting an 
availability message containing its ID to determine available agents within its 
communication range.  When a GS detects a UAV inside its communication range, it sets 
an available flag for that UAV and adds it to its auction list.  A GS offers its tasks only to 
members within its communication range.  When a GS immediately detects an available 
agent within its communication range, auctioning of its task starts.  Each UAV sends a 
bid representing its most profitable deal to the source GS.  A GS, as auctioneer, evaluates 
all received bids, and sends its cost accompanied by the minimum buy bid to the TI.   
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3.4  Policy of the Market 
Based on the description of our market given in Section (3.3), the market policy 
is introduced as follows: 
 The accepting policy states that, in order for an incoming bid to be accepted, it 
must be less than or equal to the reservation price announced by the auctioneer.  
The purpose of such policy is to maintain a successful rate of transactions, and to 
signal to traders the current market prices.   
 The matching policy defines how to match a buy bid with a sell bid.  For any 
auctioned task, the minimum sell bid will be matched with the minimum buy bid. 
 The clearing policy determines what matched bids are being executed.  
 The clearing price will be equal to the won bid (Mth) price.   
For any GS that auctions a specific task that it has paired with a UAV offering a 
minimum bid, the bids from all the GS-UAV pairs are ranked in ascending order of 
magnitude.  Suppose the number of GSs submitting bids is M.  Counting from the top 
ranked bids, the value in the Mth position is the clearing price that task is sold for, and the 
that GS and the UAV making the bid becomes the seller and the buyer (winner), 
respectively, for that task. Then the UAV delivers the task to that GS.  A task not sold 
during the auction round is re-auctioned at a higher cost as determined by Equation (3.1).  
This procedure is repeated until all tasks are sold.   
Generally, the TI can determine ‗what‘ and ‗how‘ an incoming bid is transacted.  
Briefly, we can say, for a given set of incoming orders, that the accepting policy 
determines what bids are to be accepted.  The matching policy determines whose bid can 
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be matched with whom, and the clearing policy specifies the transaction that should be 
executed.   
Transaction determinations and winners (buyers and sellers) that are going to 
transact in double auctions have two issues that need to be well defined.  For instance, 
given the buy and sell bids for the following example, which of these is going to transact 
and at what clearing price? Which will lead us to the Mth and the (M+1)st price?   
3.4.1  Mth and (M+1)st Price Rules 
Let X denotes the set of all buy and sells bids for a single task; M of these bids are 
the sell offers, and N represents the buy offers.  The Mth price rule sets the clearing price 
at the Mth lowest price among all X bids.  The (M+1)st price rule sets the clearing price at 
the (M+1)st lowest price among all X bids.  In order to determine the bids that are going 
to be transacted, the transaction set proceeds as follows: 
While the lowest remaining buy bid is less than or equal to the lowest sell bid, 
remove these bids from the set of outstanding bids and add them to the set of 
matched bids (transaction set).   
Note that the Mth price is undefined if there are no sellers, and the (M+1)st price is 
undefined if there are no buyers.   
Consider the set of bids in the double auction shown in Figure 3.1.  The number 
of total bids is X = 6, of which M (number of sell offers) = 3 and N (number of buy 
offers) is X – M = 3.  The Mth clearing price is the Mth bid among all submitted bids while 













Figure 3.1. Schematic of bids in double auction with M th and (M+1) st price 
 
 To determine the transaction set, the lowest buy bid is matched with the lowest 
sell bid, providing the constraints in Section 3.2 are met.  This process continues until the 
buy bid is higher than the sell bid.  The transaction set will be {(15, 24), (18, 25)}.  
Matched bids are removed from the outstanding bids and placed in the matched bids 
profile where the lowest sell bid and the lowest buy bid are transacted.  For instance, the 
sell bid 25 cannot be transacted since only one task will be sold, which is the lowest buy 
and sell bids. The transaction price can either be set at 25 (the Mth) or at 24 (the (M+1)st) 
price.   
 For instance, take the first set of bids in the transaction set (24, 15).  If the Mth 
price is used, then each buyer and seller will make a profit equal to ½*((24-15) + (30-
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3.4.2  Auction Structure 
This implementation consists of two different kinds of auctions: 
1. Auctions held by the TI, and 
2. Auctions held by the GSs 
3.4.2.1  Combined Auction Procedures 
The auction proceeds as follows; see also the flow diagram in Figure 3.2: 
1. Task Announcement: Each auction starts with an offer message sent by the 
auctioneer (TI) to all GSs (TI  GSs).  The message contains the task‘s id, sensor 
location, task‘s creation times, task‘s deadline, and task‘s prices.   
2. GS Call for Bid: Upon receipt of the offer message from the TI, each GS 
broadcasts the task and calculates its cost for that task.   
3. GS’s Buyers Bid Evaluation: Each GS evaluates the buy bids received from the 
UAVs for validity according to the accepting policy and chooses a bid with the 
minimum price.   
4. Bid Submission: Each GS submits its bid with the winner UAV‘s buy bid to the 
TI.   
5. Matching Result: The auctioneer (TI) evaluates all received bids and finds the 
one with the most profit.  Then it matches a GS with the minimum sell bid with 
the ID of the minimum buy bid and the clearing price.    
6. Win Confirmation: Each winner (GS or UAV) receives the result and sends a 
confirmation message to the auctioneer indicating notification about the result.   
7. Offer End: The auctioneer sends an Offer End message to the auction participants 
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Figure 3.2. Flow diagram for the market policy 
 
3.4.3  Cost Estimation 
As previously mentioned, tasks are traded between the TI, GSs and UAVs.  In 
order to define the allocation problem for such environments, it is necessary to specify 
the cost functions, as given by Equation (3.9).  
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Buyers & Sellers 
Submit Bids 
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P(Tl, GSk) = R(Tl , GSk) − C(Tl , GSk)  (3.9) 
where P is the profit generated by the ground station GSk by accepting the task Tl and R 
and C are revenue and cost functions, respectively.  The revenue function indicates the 
benefit of executing a task, and the cost function provides an estimate of the cost to 
accomplish the same task.  In this dissertation, rewards associated with tasks are not 
considered; therefore, the utility functions equal the cost of the tasks.  Further, tasks are 
waypoints, and costs define an amount that reflects the distance between each GS or 
UAV and the location of interest, such as the traveled Euclidean distance.   
The global objective of the task allocation algorithm is to minimize overall costs.  
An important term used in the following chapters is global cost, which is the sum of the 
allocated task costs.  Therefore, the global objective used for this dissertation is the 
minimization of the global cost.  The multi-ground station task allocation problem stated 
in terms of global costs is as follows: 
Given a set of tasks, T = {T1, T2, ..., Tt}, a set of GSs {GS1, GS2, ..., GSr}, and a 
function P(Ti, GSi) that specifies the cost of executing a subset T
i of the set of tasks T 







GSTP       (3.10) 
where r is the number of GSs and the subset of tasks Tj is assigned to GSj. 
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The TI issues and renews tasks, and each GS submits bids for the newly issued tasks; a 
task is assigned to the GS with the minimum bid.  The TI‘s algorithm for this allocation is 
as follows: 
if a task is created then 
announce task 
while timer is running do 
receive bids 
end while 
calculate best bid 
match buyer with seller 
award task to best match 
remove task from announcement list 
end if 
 
For each auction cycle, there is only one awarded task.  Upon winning a task, the 
winning GS broadcasts the same task(s) to the UAVs within its connectivity range.  The 
UAVs then calculate the cost for adding the new task to their current plan.  Then, the 
difference between the two plans (current plan and old plan) is the cost for 
i
UAV  to 
execute the auctioned task.   
 The algorithm for the GS task allocation is as follows: 
if a task-list is not empty then 
announce task 




calculate best bid 
send cost and best bidder  
remove task from task-list 
end if 
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When a GS assigns a task to the winning UAV, it keeps the winner‘s id, task id, winner‘s 
cost, and the task due time in different lists to maintain control of its awarded task(s).  
 In this problem, two types of costs contribute to the marginal cost of adding a new 
task to a plan: 
1. The distance cost is the cost due to the additional distance that the UAV should 
travel, and 
2. The time cost is the cost due to latency that performing this task will cause in the 
data delivery time of the other tasks already in the plan.   
3.4.4  GSs Cost Estimation 
In the set up simulated in this work, there are three GSs located 120˚ apart from 
each other around the TI.  The GSs communicate with the TI all the time.  When a task is 
created at the TI level, each GS submits a bid for that task.  The bid is based on the linear 
distance to that task and uses the task‘s information provided by the TI (i.e., id, price, 
location, and creation time), which has a different price for each task.  First, the TI 
computes the cost and the deadline time for that task according to Equations (3.11) and 
(3.12):   
TITaskCost(t) = P0(1+up*t/tH) (3.11) 
where tH is the deadline time for task TK to be received by the auctioneer, as given by 
Equation (3.12). 
tH(TK) = 2*||Tk – TI||2/
i
UAV _Speed + t (3.12) 
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where t is the time elapsed from the time the task is created until the time the task is re-
auctioned, up is a parameter to determine increments in the price, tH is the deadline time 
for the task TK to be received by the auctioneer, udc is the distance unit cost, and 
i
UAV _Speed is the speed of
i
UAV , as used in Equation (3.13).   
P0 (Tk) = 2*|| Tk – TI||2*(udc +  utcost/
i
UAV _Speed)) (3.13) 
By the time the task reaches its deadline, if up is chosen to equal 1, the price of the 
task will have doubled since its creation time.  This will motivate the GSs to bid for the 
task that was not profitable during previous auction cycles.  When a task Tk is created at 
the TI level, all GSs will use the same TI‘s price function to generate a new bid for the 
auctioned task.  The GS will place a bid equal to GSTaskCost for this task if and only if the 
constraint prescribed by Equation (3.14) is met.   
GSTaskCost≤ TITaskCost(t) (3.14) 
Therefore, the GS‘s bid will be the GS‘s linear distance to Tk and back; in addition to the 
time the UAV needs to execute the task.   
First, the GSs calculate their cost as given by Equation (3.15).  
j
GS distCost  = 2*(||dist(
j
GS  , Tk)||2*udc              1 ≤ j ≤ 3, (3.15) 
where Tk is a new auctioned task to be added to 
j
GS  current plan, and udc is the unit 
distance cost.  Second, since the speed of the UAVs is known to the GSs, any 
j
GS can 
predict the execution time for the newly auctioned task.  Therefore, the time cost to 
execute a new auctioned task is calculated using Equation (3.16).   
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j
GS t imeCost = 2*(
j
GS dist / SpeedUAV)*utcost, (3.16) 
where utcost is the time unit cost, which is known to all GSs, and 
j
GS t imeCost is the cost of 
the time for 
j
GS  to receive the task‘s data, which is based on the task‘s distance to 
j
GS , 
GSdist, and the UAV‘s speed, SpeedUAV.  The sum of Equations (3.15) and (3.16) yields 
the GS‘s estimated cost, as given by Equation (3.17). 
j
GS Cost = 
j
GS distCost + 
j
GS t imeCost (3.17) 
And the GSs bids were calculated using Equation (3.18).  
j
GS Bid =  
j
GS Cost (3.18) 
Since a GS bids according to its true valuation for a task, a bid in Equation (3.18) 
will be the actual cost of the auctioned task to the GS that will submit it to the TI.  P0 is a 
new term that the GS will use to determine the price of task(s) later.  Therefore, the GS 
will use the P0 from the TI, as given by Equation (3.3), in order to generate its cost for 
newly auctioned tasks.   
As previously mentioned, the auctioneer uses a time- increasing function P(t) for 
assigning prices to tasks.  In order for any seller to maximize all profit made, the seller 
must sell tasks won as soon as possible.  Further, a GS is not assured of selling a task 
within a fixed time because bidders will only bid when assured a profit.  This is the main 
reason for using the increasing varying price function, which encourages buyers to bid for 
unsold tasks in the near future.  Therefore, the GS will make the task price function an 
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increasing function of time, which will guarantee that UAVs will be encouraged to buy 
tasks that were not profitable to them during previous auction cycles. The price function 
is given by Equation (3.19).   
GS_P(t) = P0*(1+up*t/tH) (3.19) 
The price function also motivates bidders to bid on those tasks for which more 
time has passed since their creation and so have become more profitable.  Clearly, the 
most profitable task is not necessarily the task with the lowest cost.  Ajorlou et al. (2007) 
suggested that, since price is time varying and profit is price minus cost, this time varying 
function will have an important effect on the balance between a task‘s cost and the 
importance of a task in the task allocation process.  Assume that the price of task Tk, 
offered by the TI at time t is P(t - tT), where, tT is the creation time of Tk.  The difference 
in price, with regard to time, should be large enough to overcome the extra cost that an 
expensive important task may have compared to other offered tasks, which can improve 
the performance by decreasing the probability of successive timeouts for a given task.   
 Clearly, the auctioneer associates a price with each offered task, and upon 
appropriate completion of the task, it pays revenue equal to the task's price to the agent 
that performed the task.  Agents' bids reflect the profit they can make by accepting and 
performing tasks.  In this case, the GSs and UAVs share the profit evenly after task 
completion.  Equation 3.4 is presented again here as Equation (3.20) for clarity.   
ProfitGS = ProfitUAV = 0.5*((
jWin
GS _SBid - 
iWin




GS _SBid - 
jWin
GS _SBid)) (3.20) 
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Adding any task to the bidder‘s current plan will result in an additional distance 
an executing agent needs to travel, and the delivery time of tasks will be pushed back, as 









where t is the elapsed time since the task creation and P0 is the price of the task.  Note 
that P0 may be different for different tasks and is equal to the price the auctioneer 
announced while selling that task.  If a GS offers a task, its price is determined by the 
time-varying price function, as in Equation (3.11).  As previously mentioned, for any 
auctioned task, constraints must be satisfied in order for the task bid to be accepted.   
The auctioneer, TI, knows the price function and uses it to calculate the price 
announced to the GS when offering the task.  However, the revenue that a UAV will 
receive upon performing a task depends on both the time when it accepts the task and the 
time when it delivers the data.  Clearly, any GS will receive its revenue for any task it 
won and executed in a time not exceeding the task‘s deadline time.  
3.4.5  UAVs Cost Estimation 
The initial locations of the UAVs are generated randomly such that each UAV 
communicates with at least two GSs.  In this dissertation, a given 
i
UAV can participate in 
an auction with a given 
j
GS  if and only if 
i
UAV  is within
j
GS ‘s range and 
j




UAV ‘s range.  Whichever range is smaller will determine how close 
i
UAV  must 
be to 
j
GS  for them to participate together.  We make the simplifying assumptions that all 
UAVs and GSs have the same range.  Call the area around a 
j
GS within which it can carry 
on an auction with a UAV its domain; a UAV‘s domain is defined similarly but with 
respect to a GS.  Whether the UAV‘s range is smaller than the GS‘s range o r vice versa, 
the domains of all GSs will be the same size and shape.   
An interesting case is where the GSs‘ domains overlap.  When the TI announces 
its task(s), each GS checks for availability of UAVs before announcing a task.  When a 
GS receives a response from any UAV in its connectivity range, the GS starts to 
broadcast the announced task.  The UAV should deliver the data to the GS for which it 
sold the corresponding data-delivery task because that GS will count on that UAV 
returning it within a certain time.  As previously stated, if it delivers the data to another 
GS, it incurs a large penalty.  Recall that Equation (3.5) is  
Penalty = 0.5*(
jUAV
GS _SBid - 
jWin
GS _SBid)  
Upon receipt of a task announcement, the UAV computes its first bid and the 
estimated time taken to deliver the task to the GS according to Equations (3.22) and 
(3.23).   
UAVTaskCost = DistUAV- Tk*udcost + DistUAV- Tk*utcost/*
i
UAV _Speed (3.22) 
i
UAV tH =  DistUAV- Tk / 
i
UAV _Speed (3.23) 
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Then, the UAV places a bid for an amount equal to its cost to that GS for the task if the 
constraints prescribed by Equations (3.24) and (3.25) are met.  
i
UAV TaskCost(Tk)  ≤ TITaskCost(t) and (3.24) 
i
UAV tH(TK)  ≤  TItH(TK) - tUAVstart (3.25) 
where tUAVstart is the time the UAV starts executing the task in its task list.   
If the UAV already has at least one task in its task list, then calculating the marginal 
cost is NP hard and requires re-planning for a new set of tasks.  For simplicity, we use a 
heuristic in which we inserted the new task in all possible positions in the current plan and 
chose the one that minimized the distance cost of the new plan.  In addition to Equation 
(3.26), the constraints denoted by Equations (3.27) and (3.28) have to be met.   
TItHnew ≤ TItHold  (3.26) 
tUAVstart + tPathNew ≤ TItHnew  (3.27) 
UAVTaskCostExtra ≤ TITaskCost(TK) (3.28) 
where  
UAVTaskCostExtra = UAVCostCurrentPath - UAVCostPreviousPath.   
TItHold and TItHnew are the task deadlines for the immediate previous and the new task to bid 
for, respectively; UAVTaskCostExtra is the extra cost for adding on an additional task.  If all 
these constraints are met, then the UAV places a bid for the new task according to Equation 
(3.29). 
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UAVTaskCost(TK)    = UAVTaskCostExtra (3.29) 
 
3.5  Robustness 
3.5.1  UAV Malfunction 
In this dynamic research environment of market-based mechanisms, recall that, in 
order for a UAV to submit a bid, the UAV must first is able to deliver the task on time, 
meaning that the UAV's contract is time- limited, and the UAV is responsible for 
delivering its won task in a timely fashion.  During task execution, in the event a UAV 
malfunction, the tasks may not be delivered as desired.  All undelivered tasks are re-
auctioned to existing UAVs when the UAV never recovers to complete the task in its task 
list.  To plan for any uncertainties, undelivered tasks from a disconnected UAV are not 
immediately re-auctioned.  First, the GS allocates an extended time.  Then, after this time 
has elapsed, undelivered tasks are re-auctioned.  This extended time is computed using 
Equation (3.30).   
tReauction  = (1+γ) * min(TItH-
i
UAV ) 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 (3.30) 
where TItH-
i
UAV contains task deadlines for all the tasks that are in the task list  for a 
specific
i
UAV .   
Since the route information for each UAV is known, the location of the UAV can 
easily be found.  Since the re-auction happens very frequently (every 2 secs), all UAVs 
hover around their current locations until announced re-auctioned tasks are sold.  A GS 
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will assume a UAV malfunction if a certain amount of time has passed since task(s) 
deadline has elapsed and the GS did not yet receive their corresponding data.  γ is a 
constant number chosen between zero and one, which is multiplied by the deadline to 
allow latency in delivering data due to possible estimation errors.  The task deadline 
triggers a UAV malfunction detection and recovery.  When a GS experiences a situation 
where needed task data was not received for a period of at least equal to the threshold 
time, it auctions all tasks won by the malfunctioned UAV.  Additionally, the fact that the 
price is an increasing function of time accelerates the recovery process by providing more 
profit for timed out tasks compared to the corresponding profit of its regular price.   
When the re-auction begins, all the remaining tasks (undelivered tasks) from each 
UAV become the previous task list.  Consequently, the route starting from the current 
location of that UAV becomes the immediate previous route.  As a result, the procedures 
described for GS and UAV bidding for a new task still apply except the new task 
deadline for any re-auctioned task is determined by Equation (3.31).   
TItHnewj  = TItHoldj + tjReauction – max(tMalfunctioned, tUAVstart) (3.31) 
where  
TItHnewj is the new task deadline for a given task j,  
TItHoldj is the old task deadline for a given task j,  
tMalfunctioned is the time at which the UAV get malfunctioned, and 
tjReauction ≥ tReauction is the time at which task j is re-auctioned.   
3.5.2  Communication Failure 
A UAV might also fail to communicate during the auction process.  Frequent 
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auctioning allows the UAV to regain its ground and is an essential part of this 
coordination method designed to accelerate the recovery of such a problem.  As soon as a 
UAV recovers from the communication failure by being able to communicate with any 
GS, the UAV will start observing the auction rules and participate in new auctions.   
Dias et al. (2003) suggested the following strategies to improve robustness: 
 monitoring the communication connectivity to robots that have subcontracted 
tasks,  
 frequent auctioning and bidding, which help reallocate tasks among robots more 
efficiently,  
 the absence of assumptions that all agents will participate in any auction, and 




MULTI-GROUND STATIONS TASK ALLOCATION WITH 
DOUBLE AUCTION 
 
This chapter studies the performance of market-based coordination methods to 
demonstrate how a double auction can influence the quality of the solution.  Double 
auction consists of multiple buyers and sellers participating to trade a commodity.  Each 
buyer and seller submits a bid representing its offer to buy or sell the auctioned 
commodity.  Submitted bids are matched, and the auction is cleared thereafter.  A double 
auction, then, is a two-sided auction.  One side represents a centralized approach while 
the other represents a distributed approach. This enables the market to compute the 
information in an efficient manner while providing quicker responses.   
This study investigated the effect of increasing the UAVs‘ communication ranges 
on the distance travelled, and the time of task delivery using a different number of tasks 
while the UAVs participated in double auction coordination.  Therefore, the global 
objective used in this dissertation is the minimization of the global cost (distance 
travelled).   
 
4.1  Market Setup  
The market setup consists of an allocation of a set T of tasks among a set of GSs 
partitioning T among the GSs, where T = {T1, T2, . . . , Tn} and GSs = { GS1, GS2, . . . , 
GSm}. This is denoted by a tuple [T
1, T2 , ... , Tn-1, Tn ] where:  
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 Each subset of tuples represents tasks assigned to a GS, i.e., a ground station GSi 
is assigned the tasks represented by Ti = {Ta, Tb, . . . , Tt}, which is a subset of 
the set T. 
 The union of the sets of tasks in the tuple is equal to the complete set of tasks, i.e.,  
Tl  T
k ...  Tn = T 
 The sets in the tuple are pairwise disjoint, i.e., Tl  Tk = Ø; for all i k. 
The purpose of using a task allocation algorithm is to minimize overall costs, which are 
defined as the sum of the allocated task costs.  Hence, a task allocation problem for 
multiple GSs can be stated as follows: 
Given a set of tasks, T = [T1, T2, . . . , Tn], a set of GSs  = [GS1, GS2, . . . , GSm], and a 
function P(Ti , GSk) that specifies the utility of executing a subset of tasks T
i by GSi, i 
= 1, 2, …, n, find the allocation of tasks to GSi that optimizes the overall objective.  
Tasks are issued by the TI to the GSs for bidding, and allocated to the GSs with the 
minimum bid.  In defining the allocation problem, it is important to specify the cost 
function given in Chapter 3, Equation 3.2, repeated here as Equation 4.1.   
 P(Ti, GSk) = R(T
i , GSk) − C(T
i , GSk), (4.1) 
where P is the profit generated by the ground station GSk for accepting tasks T
i, and R 
and C are the revenue and cost functions, respectively.  The revenue function, R(Ti, GSk), 
represents the cost benefit to GSk for executing task Ti, and the cost function, C(T
i , GSk), 
represents a cost estimate for GSk for accomplishing the same task.  Tasks are waypoints, 
and costs are numbers that reflect the distance between each GS and a waypoint of 
interest, such as the Euclidean travelled distance.   
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4.2  Simulation Setup  
This section describes the simulation environment that consists of one TI, three 
GSs, and a different number of UAVs.  The TI, GSs, and UAVs interact over tasks issued 
by the TI.  The TI is located at the origin of a 3D-space bounded by the following ranges:  
 -2CommUAVMax ≤ x ≤ 2CommUAVMax, 
 -2CommUAVMax≤ y ≤ 2CommUAVMax, and  
 0 ≤ z ≤ 2 CommUAVMax,  
where CommUAVMax is the maximum communication radius admissible by a UAV during 
the design of that UAV, and x, y, and z are the coordinate axis.   
As shown in Figure 4.1, the three GSs are located 120˚ apart from each other 
around the TI, and can communicate with the TI at all times.  The initial locations of the 
UAVs are generated randomly such that each UAV communicates with at least two GSs.  
A given 
i
UAV can participate with a given 
j
GS  if and only if 
i
UAV  is within
j
GS ‘s range 
and 
j
GS  is within
i
UAV ‘s range.  Whichever range is smallest determines how close 
i
UAV  must be to 
j
GS  for them to participate together.  The simplifying assumption is 
that all UAVs and GSs have the same range.  The area around 
j
GS  in which it can carry 
on an auction with a UAVi is its domain.  Whether the UAV‘s range is smaller than the 
GS‘s range or vice versa, the domains of all GSs are the same size and shape.   
The TI‘s and GSs‘ communication ranges are 100 meters, and 200 meters, 
respectively.  Any GS has at least one UAV within its communication range before the 
start of the initial auction.  Any UAV can communicate with at least two GSs at the 
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beginning of the auction.  To enhance the design‘s quality of solution, the UAVs‘ 
communication ranges fell between 250 meters to 2,500 meters, and their speed is 10 
m/s.  The unit distance cost (udcost) is set at $0.1 / m, the time unit cost (tucost) at $0.1 /s, 
and up, a parameter to determine an increase in price, is set at 1.  Each task has a different 
value, which is determined by its distance from the TI.  This implies that, using the time 
varying price function, the price for a task will double when it reaches its deadline, tH, 


































Figure 4.1.  Setup of TI, three GSs and nine UAVs for double auction 
 
Each GS submits bids for newly issued tasks.  A task is assigned to a pair of GSs 
and the UAV with the minimum bid.  A task is an act of visiting and collecting data from 
a specific sensor location by a UAV and delivering the collected data to the TI through a 
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GS later.  In a practical sense, a TI could be a control room or any agent (including 
humans) with the ability to initiate and re-allocate tasks to the fittest pair of GSs and 
UAVs through double auction.  In this scenario, the UAVs have the ability to buy from 
more than one GS and deliver tasks to a source GS.   
 
4.3  Interaction between TI and GSs 
This section describes the interaction between the TI and GSs with emphasis on 
optimizing task allocation in double auction.  Presented are the results of five runs with 
relative statistics and associated profits.   
4.3.1  Double Auction between GSs and UAVs  
All GSs compete as self- interested agents to maximize their profits, and the 
UAVs aim to minimize their overall distance travelled in order to execute tasks.  The 
distance cost of adding a new task to any GS‘s current plan is double the linear distance 
from the GS to the task location in addition to the time needed for task(s) execution.  
Since the UAVs‘ speed is known, the GSs can predict the time cost for an auctioned task.  
Based on this information, the GSs submit their bids to the TI (refer to Chapter 3).   
Task performance is measured using the averages of at least five runs for each 
communication range.  Initially, Tables 4.1 through 4.5 summarizes the results for each 
run for the GSs and UAVs, and the profits each made during the auction cycles.  Table 
4.1 presents the data for twelve random tasks for six UAVs at 250 meters and the 
transactions between the UAVs and GSs for exchanging task(s) during each run.  
Randomly generated tasks do not necessarily mean tasks will be bought by the same 
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UAV from the previous run.  Instead, the cost of any task might change during each run 
depending on how far the task is from the UAV, and the time needed for execution.  
 
Table 4.1. Run 1: Profit generated by GSs and six UAVs while auctioning 12 
 random tasksat 250 meters 











T1 $1117 $1084 2 2 $1023 $47 
T2 $310 $268 1 4 $215 $48 
T3 $1271 $1233 2 1 $1172 $50 
T4 $1136 $1107 2 1 $368 $384 
T5 $1502 $1466 1 3 $1410 $46 
T6 $832 $799 1 3 $336 $248 
T7 $842 $819 1 1 $410 $216 
T8 $508 $460 3 1 $216 $146 
T9 $630 $612 3 2 $167 $231 
T10 $1318 $1289 3 5 $1215 $51 
T11 $1235 $1202 3 5 $277 $479 
T12 $1702 $1664 2 6 $1616 $43 
 
Since delivery cost is assumed to be at the intersection of the UAVs‘ 
communication range and the target sensor location, tasks executed by each UAV might 
also change from one run to the next, depending on whether the task(s) on the UAV‘s list 
permits executing a newly auctioned task without making any of its previous won task(s) 
timeout.  The profit each UAV and GS generates during a double auction relies on how 
well the UAVs are positioned during the auctioned task with respect to the task‘s location 
and the UAV‘s communication ranges.  The program ran for at least five times to 
generate profit, as denoted by Equation 4.2.   
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1




GS average profit Average UAVi ofit j  (4.2) 
where m is the number of UAVs that paired with 
j
GS  during the auction and 
j
GS _average_profit is the average profit made by that specific GS.  The data in Tables 
4.2 through 4.5 show the profit for each GS and a list of corresponding UAVs for runs 2 
through 5.   
 
Table 4.2. Run 2: Profit generated by GSs and six UAVs while auctioning 12 
 random tasks at 250 meters 
Seller (GS) ID GS Total Profit GS Task List Buyer (UAV) ID 
1 $462 4, 5, 11, 12 1, 2, 4, 6 
2 $255 3, 6 1, 2 
3 $873 1, 2 ,7, 8, 9, 10  1, 4, 5, 6 
 
Table 4.3.  Run 3: Profit generated by GSs and six UAVs while auctioning 12    
  random tasks at 250 meters 
Seller (GS) ID GS Total Profit GS Task List Buyer (UAV) ID 
1 $736 1, 7, 8, 9 1, 3, 4 
2 $1578 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12 2, 4, 1, 5 
3 $444 10 1 
 
Table 4.4. Run 4: Profit generated by GSs and six UAVs while auctioning 12 
 random tasks at 250 meters 
Seller (GS) ID GS Total Profit GS Task List Buyer (UAV) ID 
1 $1258 2, 3, 6, 9, 10 3, 4, 5 
2 $935 7, 8, 11, 12 3, 4 
3 $648 1, 4, 5 3, 5 
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Table 4.5. Run 5: Profit generated by GSs and six UAVs while auctioning 12 
 random tasks at 250 meters 
Seller (GS) ID GS Total Profit GS Task List Buyer (UAV) ID 
1 $606 3, 5, 6, 10, 12 2, 3, 4 
2 $202 1, 7 1, 4 
3 $809 2, 4, 8, 9, 11 1, 2, 5, 6 
 
4.3.2  Results for increasing UAVs’ Communication Range 
The impact of increasing the UAVs‘ communication ranges was investigated to 
enhance the quality of the solution for each GS.  Profits are divided evenly between 
participating GSs and UAVs.  Therefore, each GS‘s profit influenced the total distance 
travelled by the UAVs on the GS‘s / UAV list and the total execution time for its task(s), 
which affected the UAV‘s ability to reach and execute tasks at an earlier time.  Further, 
since all UAVs‘ speed is constant, the only factor that affected a task‘s reachability is 
their communication ranges.   
The average GSs profit generated from these runs is the profit made by all UAVs 
on its UAV list.  The profit for the GSs at each communication range during the five runs 
was summed to give the average profit.  As shown in Table 4.6, each GS‘s profit 
continued to increase as the UAVs‘ commun ication ranges increased.  Because the UAVs 
share profits evenly with their GSs, they also benefitted from increasing their 
communication range.   
As depicted in Table 4.6 and Figure 4.2, increasing the UAVs‘ communication 
range affected not only the profit each buyer and seller generated, but also the task‘s 
execution time as well.  The UAV‘s constant speed contributed to the decrease in the 
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distance travelled to execute a task, which was a direct result of increasing the UAV‘s 
communication range.  Thus, the decrease of distance travelled automatically affected the 
task execution time.   
 

























GS1 $724 $749 $774 $801 $837 $961 $981 $1070 $1081 $1101 
GS2 $699 $719 $739 $758 $917 $940 $962 $984 $1001 $1025 
GS3 $736 $754 $771 $788 $791 $876 $898 $903 $939 $959 
 
 
Figure 4.2. UAV1’s trace of path time of task execution at different  
communication ranges 
 
Figure 4.2 shows UAV1‘s path of tasks execution during different communication 
ranges that depicts the impact of increasing the UAV‘s communication ranges over the 
tasks‘ execution time, which reduced the UAV‘s ability to deliver its tasks earlier since it 
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travelled less distance to its intended GS and target sensor.  Figure 4.2 also shows a large 
drop in UAV1‘s path execution time when its communication range increased from 1250 
meters to 1500 meters.  At 1250 meters, UAV1 won tasks 10 and 6; while at 1500 meters 
UAV1 won tasks 11 and 4.  Therefore, the reason for the drop in path execution time is 
that they have different coordinates.  
Tasks must also be delivered on time such that any UAV will not bid for any 
auctioned task that will cause any of its current task(s) to timeout.  Since tasks are 
generated randomly, their IDs and number of tasks won by an individual UAV may 
change from one run to the next; therefore, the time required to execute the task(s) may 
change accordingly.  Table 4.7 shows the tasks path execution times and their tasks for 
UAV1 with varied communication ranges.  The results show it took less time when the 
UAV‘s communication range increased for the same task(s) to be delivered to the same 
destination.   
 
Table 4.7.  UAV1’s tasks execution time during different communication ranges 
UAV Communication 
Range (m) 
Tasks Path Execution Times 
(sec) 
Task List 
250 2056 11, 6, 10 
500 2033 11, 6, 10 
750 2011 11, 6, 10 
1,000 1930 6, 10 
1,250 1907 6, 10 
1,500 708 11, 4 
1,750 685 11, 4 
2,000 663 11, 4 
2,250 640 11, 4 
2,500 618 11, 4 
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4.3.3  Results of Average Distance Travelled and Average Time to Perform Tasks 
In a double auction, UAVs may submit their bids to more than one GS to increase 
their chances of winning an auctioned task as self- interested agents.  Different cases were 
investigated to show the effect of increasing the buyers‘ communication ranges during a 
double auction.  A base case involves nine random tasks auctioned to three GSs to sell to 
six UAVs bidding to execute these tasks.  Table 4.8 shows the average total distance 
travelled to execute the tasks and the average time required to perform the tasks.   
The data in Table 4.8 shows that the average time needed to execute tasks 
improved as the UAV‘s communication range increased. When the UAVs 
communication ranges increased from 250 meters to 2500 meters, the average distance of 
data delivery decreased by 16.8%.  As shown in Table 4.9, this decrease resulted in all 
the GSs receiving a profit increase.  GS1, GS2, and GS3 realized an increase in their 
average profit up to 39.8%, 57.9% and 20.9%, respectively.  
 
Table 4.8.  Data delivery statistics for nine random tasks by six UAVs 
UAV Communication 
Range(m) 
Mean Data Delivery 
Distance (m) 
Mean Tasks Execution Time 
(sec) 
250 9871 987 
500 9625 962 
750 9445 944 
1,000 9264 927 
1,250 9085 909 
1,500 8905 890 
1,750 8725 872 
2,000 8545 855 
2,250 8371 837 
2,500 8213 821 
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Table 4.9. Average GSs profit from selling nine tasks to six UAVs 
UAV 
Communicati





















GS1 $431 $454 $474 $493 $513 $533 $553 $573 $590 $602 
GS2 $458 $504 $532 $559 $586 $613 $640 $668 $696 $723 
GS3 $535 $548 $560 $573 $585 $597 $610 $622 $634 $647 
 
This research used two cases to investigate the scalability of the market-based 
coordination.  In Case-1, the number of tasks was increased from 9 to 12, and in Case-2, 
decreased from nine to six, respectively, while the number of UAVs that carried out the 
job remained unchanged at six.  The task execution time decreased for each UAV 
delivering to the same destination as its communication range increased.  As shown in 
Table 4.10, the average data delivery distance travelled by all six UAVs decreased.  
 
Table 4.10. Data delivery statistics for 12 random tasks by six UAVs 
UAV Communication 
Range(m) 
Mean Data Delivery 
Distance (m) 
Mean Tasks Time 
Execution (sec) 
250 12676 1268 
500 12489 1249 
750 12301 1230 
1,000 12104 1210 
1,250 11821 1182 
1,500 11119 1119 
1,750 10924 1092 
2,000 10572 1057 
2,250 10341 1034 
2,500 10131 1013 
 
Even though the market is scaled up, it still benefitted from double auction, and is 
better off by 3% in the distance travelled when tasks are scaled up to twelve as compared 
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to the base case; see Table 4.8.  This improvement accompanied an improvement in the 
quality of the solution since the decrease in the average time of task execution showed 
the same result for the reduction in the distance travelled.    
Computing the profit generated by each GS in the double auction provides a 
better view of these results.  As the number of auctioned tasks increased for the same 
UAVs, the probability of increasing the profit for each participating UAV increased.  By 
scaling the number of auctioned tasks to twelve, GS1, GS2 and GS3 received an increase 
in their profit by 52%, 46.6% and 30.2%, respectively.   
In Case-2, the number of tasks was scaled down to six tasks to be bought by the 
same six UAVs who participated in double auction in Case-1.  The data in Tables 4.11 
and 4.12 show the results from increasing the UAVs communication range. 
 
Table 4.11. Data delivery statistics for six random tasks by six UAVs 
UAV Communication 
Range(m) 
Mean Data Delivery 
Distance (m) 
Mean Tasks Execution Time 
(sec) 
250 8080 808 
500 7937 794 
750 7783 778 
1,000 7640 764 
1,250 7420 742 
1,500 7258 726 
1,750 6958 696 
2,000 6793 679 
2,250 6595 659 
2,500 6430 643 
 
To investigate the matter further, using the same tasks, the numbers of buyers 
were increased from six to nine to buy twelve tasks that were sold in Case-1.  As in Case-
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1, increasing the UAV‘s ranges affected the average data delivery time for an auctioned 
task by allowing it to be performed in a shorter time as data delivery will be completed 
earlier due to the increase in the UAVs‘ communication range.  Table 4.13 and Figure 4.3 
show the effect on average time of tasks execution when the UAVs‘ ranges increased.   
 
























GS1 $130 $148 $165 $182 $200 $217 $234 $251 $278 $292 
GS2 $291 $303 $320 $353 $370 $387 $465 $482 $502 $521 
GS3 $192 $209 $226 $244 $261 $280 $284 $304 $324 $343 
 
Table 4.13. Execution time of 12 tasks by UAVs during different  
 communication ranges 
UAV Communication 
Range(m) 
Average Time Travelled by 6 
UAVs 
Average Time 
Travelled by 9 UAVs 
250 1268 836 
500 1249 824 
750 1230 811 
1,000 1210 798 
1,250 1182 785 
1,500 1119 740 
1,750 1092 725 
2,000 1057 700 
2,250 1034 685 
2,500 1013 670 
 
 Increasing the communication ranges also improved the quality of the solution by 
reducing the execution time, thus increasing each participant‘s profit.  Table 4.14 shows 
that increasing a UAV‘s communication range led to a decrease in the t ime travelled and 
a decrease in the average distance travelled.  Accordingly, the decrease in the distance 
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travelled or the time of execution yielded an increase in the profit generated by 
participating UAVs, as shown in Table 4.15.  This meant that the increase in profit would 
be divided evenly between the GSs and their UAVs.  
 
 
Figure 4.3.  Execution time of same 12 tasks in double auction 
 
Table 4.14.  Data delivery statistics for 12 random tasks by nine UAVs 
UAV Communication 
Range(m) 
Mean Data Delivery 
Distance Cost 
Mean Task Execution 
Time(sec) 
250 $8364 836 
500 $8239 824 
750 $8114 811 
1,000 $7981 798 
1,250 $7854 785 
1,500 $7398 740 
1,750 $7253 725 
2,000 $6997 700 
2,250 $6851 685 
2,500 $6699 670 
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Table 4.15. GSs average profit while auctioning five sets of 12 random tasks  
























GS1 $751 $774 $796 $822 $845 $968 $988 $1088 $1090 $1112 
GS2 $832 $854 $877 $899 $921 $944 $966 $989 $1016 $1033 
GS3 $722 $739 $756 $774 $792 $879 $901 $905 $948 $985 
 
 This reduction in tasks execution time meant that the distance travelled also 
reduced as observed earlier since the UAV‘s speed is constant.  In fact, the decrease in 
the average execution time is a direct result of the decrease in the average distance 
travelled as depicted in Figure 4.4, where six UAVs compete to buy a different number of 
auctioned tasks.   
 
 
Figure 4.4. Average distance travelled by six UAVs competing over a different 
number of tasks 
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Since the average task execution time decreased as a result of increasing the 
UAVs‘ communication ranges, the profit generated by the UAVs increased as well.  The 
increase in the UAVs‘ profit led to an increase in the average profit generated by GSs as 
their profit is the summation of all profit made by each participant UAV that bought 
task(s) from that specific GS, as mentioned before in Equation 4.2.  As an example, refer 
to Figure 4.5 and Table 4.15. 
 
 
Figure 4.5.  GSs average profit of selling 12 tasks to nine UAVs  
 
Scaling up the number of UAVs from six to nine competing over the same 
number of tasks resulted in the same improvement as the reduction in the average of task 
execution time and the distance travelled (Figures 4.3 and 4.4, respectively) as well as the 
profit generated due to increasing the UAVs‘ communication ranges (Figure 4.5).  
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Scaling up the number of tasks to twelve resulted in a decrease of 31.8% in the 
average task execution times, while the UAVs ranges increased from 250 meters to 2500 
meters; see Table 4.13. 
Increasing the number of UAVs competing for the same number of tasks resulted 
in finding the fittest UAV, and a quicker response, which decreased the average distance 
travelled as well as the average task execution times, as depicted by Figure 4.6.   
 
 
Figure 4.6.  UAVs average distance travelled to execute 12 tasks 
 
4.3.4  System Robustness 
 In a dynamic research environment, system robustness is one of the most 
important criteria for reliability.  The availability of task data to the TI is very crucial, 
particularly in military operations or rescue missions; therefore, the system must be 
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robust.  To validate the system‘s robustness, UAV1, which had four tasks in its current 
plan, {9, 10, 11, and 12} assumed to fail before delivering any of its tasks to GS2, as 




























Figure 4.7.  Path for executing tasks by UAV1 
 
As a result, GS2 detected the absence of UAV1‘s task data after  time passed 
because the deadline due time, tH, for the first task was due by UAV1.  To recover from 
this failure, using the time-increasing function with higher prices to accelerate recovering 
these tasks, GS2 re-auctioned the undelivered tasks to the UAVs within its 
communication range.  The eligible UAVs submitted their bids for those tasks from 
where they were at the beginning of re-auctioning, as shown in Table 4.16.  During re-
auctioning, UAV2 won tasks 9 and 12 in addition to those delivered earlier, and on time.  
For clarity, the execution path of tasks won by UAV2 before and after re-auctioning is 
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shown in Figure 4.8.  While UAV4 won task10 and delivered it to GS1 and the fourth re-
auctioned task was delivered by UAV1, it recovered from its failure and was able to win 
this task during re-auctioning because at that time the task was already on its task list.   
 
Table 4.16.  UAVs coordinates at re-auctioning tasks 
UAVi x y z 
1 313 -61 315 
2 -115 200 0 
3 -115 200 0 
4 219 13 139 
5 -115 -180 134 
6 -115 -200 0 
 
This robustness affected the time of data delivery due to the extended time due to 
tasks not delivered on time.  Therefore, the average time for tasks delivered increased 
from 1005 seconds to 1095 seconds.  The difference in these two numbers represents the 
cost for making the system robust to uncertainty, and is the cost for assuring data 
delivery.   
Since re-auctioning in this case takes place only when tasks are not delivered at 
their expected due time, re-auctioning undelivered tasks will cause some delay on the 
average data delivery time.  As shown in Figure 4.9, when 12 tasks was delivered by six 
UAVs, at a range of 250 meters, re-auctioning caused a 295 seconds delay in data 
delivery; while at a range of 2500 meters, re-auctioning caused the same data to be 




































CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This dissertation studied the problem of collecting data from a series of unmanned 
ground sensors (UGSs) using a team of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and delivering 
the information to a task initiator (TI) through the ground stations (GSs).  The problem 
formulated into a procurement auction between the TI and GSs and a double auction 
between the GSs and UAVs, which was formalized as a continuous time-constraint 
version of a multi-traveling salesperson problem. 
A market-based coordination method was simulated using double auction 
methods applying concepts of price, revenue, and cost to trade task allocations between 
the UAVs and GSs.  A double auction enabled the TI to benefit from 1) having different 
ground stations reach farther locations in a timely manner, and 2) cost efficiency by 
allowing task executions through a different agent in the system, which led to a decrease 
in time and cost.  
The market-based method used communication efficiently because it compressed 
the UAVs‘ data into bids.  The role of the TI, in addition to task creation and holding 
auctions, was as a market matcher that matched the sell bids and purchased bids during 
the double auctions.  The GSs are buyers that participated with the TI and sellers in the 
double auctions.  This allowed the UAVs to control the allocation process by the bids 
they submitted.  All GSs participated in auctioning tasks received from the TI to UAVs 
that submitted bids to one or more GSs.  This gave the UAVs more chances to win the 
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auctioned tasks.  Therefore, the buyer's cost for executing the task was considered in a 
bid that reflected the maximum price the buyer can pay for that task.  Thus, the seller‘s 
bid is considered the minimum price acceptable to trade the task.  
As a global objective, this dissertation used double auctions to minimize the 
overall cost. During the auctioning process, the UAV's cost for executing tasks was 
considered a bid that did not exceed the auctioneer‘s reserve price.  Therefore, more than 
one agent may submit the same bid, and the auctioneer‘s role was as tiebreaker.  GSs 
were bounded by the TI‘s reservation price when submitting their bids to the TI; hence, 
they benefitted from the buyers that bid for less in case they did not win the task.  Yet 
there was still an opportunity for them to receive partial profit in case their buyer agent 
became the winner.  The GSs used the TI‘s reserve price to come up with their own price 
for the auctioned task that was based on their linear distance to the auctioned task, and 
the time needed to execute a task by a prospective winner, which was based on the 
known speed of the UAVs.  UAVs submitted their buy offers to the market (GS in this 
situation) according to the market rules; the seller‘s decision was based on the minimum 
bid.   
For any auctioned task, there is a deadline time for the task data to be received by 
the auctioneer.  When execution of a candidate task would cause the execution of any 
task in the UAV‘s current plan to miss its deadline, the UAV did not submit a bid for that 
auctioned task.  Thus, data delivery time affected the amount of profit a UAV could earn; 
the sooner the task(s) were delivered to the auctioneer, the more profit the UAV 
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generated, which was a direct result of the UAV‘s communication range.  Increasing the 
UAVs‘ communication ranges enabled them to deliver the needed data sooner.   
This double auction operated differently than a regular double auction.  The 
overall objective was to minimize overall costs.  Bids were ranked from minimum to the 
maximum; the agent with the minimum bid was awarded the task assuming all 
constraints were met. 
Using the increasing price function, re-auctioning the GSs‘ tasks improved the 
quality of the solution because all tasks at the end were bid on and thereafter assigned.  
Re-auctioning made the system robust and maintained strong control over all auctioned 
tasks regardless of any uncertainty agents might have faced (e.g., UAV communication 
malfunction) during task execution.  When a UAV was unable to perform its tasks, these 
tasks were assigned to other agents through a new auction held by the GS that was 
supposed to receive the data on time. 
This double auction generated a random number of tasks to be executed by a 
different number of UAVs to determine the effect on the quality of the solution.  For the 
same number of tasks, having more UAVs participate in the auction resulted in a quicker 
response by reducing the average distance traveled, and the average time of tasks 
execution decreased as well.  Increasing the communication ranges also improved the 
quality of the solution by reducing the execution time and increasing the profit for each 
participant.   
Assuming each UAV is self- interested, the total time to complete all the tasks 
assigned to it was minimized.  Tasks were assigned through bidding according to double 
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auction rules.  Additionally, communication malfunctions of the UAVs were simulated.   
In this research, UAVs could become disabled and so fail to deliver their task(s). 
Therefore, UAV malfunctioning introduces new challenges for this system.  Since each 
UAV is responsible for delivering its won tasks, it will have to assure delivering the 
completed tasks to the source GS without any delay to maximize its won profit.  
Otherwise, the UAV suffers a severe penalty.  The robustness issue was addressed by 
introducing a point of failure for some UAVs during task execution.  This was done by 
disconnecting a UAV before it delivered all or some of its tasks to their final destination.  
Since the tasks are time limited, the system‘s robustness was validated by re-auctioning 
undelivered tasks(s) by the prospective receiver GS after gamma ( ) time passed since 
their due time.  However, a disabled UAV could recover from its failure during re-
auctioning, and if it participated in the bidding of any task(s) on its task list, the UAV 
wins those tasks if the UAV was already on its way to deliver the tasks‘ data when it was 
disabled.   
The GS malfunctioning issue is an area for future research, since the current 
constraints made it difficult to handle at this time.  Going forward, UAVs may have 
different capabilities such as different speeds and different communication ranges; 
therefore, research is needed to explore the effect of these on the quality of the solution 
and the profit that can be generated.  To address relevant issues in double auctions, future 
research can also expand on this research by exploring double auctions between GSs in 
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DOUBLE AUCTION TRACES 
 
Actual GS communication radius for the overlap case is: 400  
TI communication radius: 231 
 
 
GSs and UAVs bid pairs: 
           GS       GS_Bid       UAV      UAV_Bid 
     1   475     3   406 
     2   Inf     3   433 
     3   Inf     3   447 
 
GSs and UAVs bid pairs: 
           GS       GS_Bid       UAV      UAV_Bid 
           1        1105           1        1034 
           2        1101           1        1032 
           3         Inf           1        1069 
 
GSs and UAVs bid pairs: 
           GS       GS_Bid       UAV      UAV_Bid 
           1        1077           1         907 
           2         Inf           1         945 
           3        1085           1         911 
 
GSs and UAVs bid pairs: 
           GS       GS_Bid       UAV      UAV_Bid 
     1   Inf     1   307 
     2   524     1   307 
     3   Inf     1   307 
 
GSs and UAVs bid pairs: 
           GS       GS_Bid       UAV      UAV_Bid 
     1   Inf     2   766 
     2   805     2   735 
     3   Inf     2   764 
 
GSs and UAVs bid pairs: 
           GS       GS_Bid       UAV      UAV_Bid 
     1   407     2    64 
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     2   380     2    64 
     3   Inf     2    64 
 
GSs and UAVs bid pairs: 
           GS       GS_Bid       UAV      UAV_Bid 
     1   Inf     5   939 
     2   980     5   920 
     3   Inf     5   942 
 
GSs and UAVs bid pairs: 
           GS       GS_Bid       UAV      UAV_Bid 
     1   561     5   285 
     2   586     5   297 
     3   Inf     5   297 
 
GSs and UAVs bid pairs: 
           GS       GS_Bid       UAV      UAV_Bid 
           1         Inf           9        1343 
           2         Inf           9        1331 
           3        1374           9        1304 
 
GSs and UAVs bid pairs: 
           GS       GS_Bid       UAV      UAV_Bid 
           1        1158           9         947 
           2        1179           9         957 
           3         Inf           9         970 
 
GSs and UAVs bid pairs: 
           GS       GS_Bid       UAV      UAV_Bid 
     1   599     9   133 
     2   Inf     9   133 
     3   602     9   133 
 
GSs and UAVs bid pairs: 
           GS       GS_Bid       UAV      UAV_Bid 
           1        1077           4         993 
           2         Inf           4        1014 
           3        1052           4         981 
 
 
UAV_TaskList =  
 
  Columns 1 through 5 
    [1x3 double]    [1x2 double]    [1]    [12]    [1x2 double] 
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  Columns 6 through 9 
     []     []     []    [1x3 double] 
 
Ground Stations coordinates (in rows): 
   231     0     0 
  -115   200     0 
  -115  -200     0 
 
UAVs Initial Coordinates (in rows): 
  -114   219   121 
   -78   199   106 
   218    28   132 
   -65  -151   144 
   -24  -127   169 
   -52  -144   111 
  -115  -180   106 
  -115  -180   119 
  -115  -180   132 
 
Tasks Coordinates (in rows): 
        2073         832         759 
        2297        4431        1144 
        2802       -3897        1470 
       -2120        1407         433 
       -1624        2492        2422 
         261        1538        1028 
       -1035        2227        3860 
        1926        1837         503 
       -4385       -3825        2759 
        2814        2401        3910 
        1079       -1712        1941 
         567       -3680        3210 
 
RECORDS FOR UAV1: 
Tasklist: 
     2     3     4 
 
Minimum Route: 
     1     4     2     3     1 
 
StartTime  DeliveryTime  PathTime LatestDeliveryTime 
          22        2063        2041        2581 
RECORDS FOR UAV2: 
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Tasklist: 
     5     6 
 
Minimum Route: 
     2     6     5     2 
StartTime  DeliveryTime  PathTime LatestDeliveryTime 
          22         749         727        1868 
RECORDS FOR UAV3: 
Tasklist: 
     1 
 
Minimum Route: 
     3     1     1 
 
StartTime  DeliveryTime  PathTime LatestDeliveryTime 
          22         391         369        2359 
 
RECORDS FOR UAV4: 
Tasklist: 
    12 
 
Minimum Route: 
     4    12     3 
 
StartTime  DeliveryTime  PathTime LatestDeliveryTime 
          22         914         892        4916 
 
RECORDS FOR UAV5: 
Tasklist: 
     7     8 
 
Minimum Route: 
     5     7     8     1 
 
StartTime  DeliveryTime  PathTime LatestDeliveryTime 
          22        1117        1095        2709 
 
RECORDS FOR UAV9: 
Tasklist: 
     9    10    11 
 
Minimum Route: 
     9     9    11    10     1 
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StartTime  DeliveryTime  PathTime LatestDeliveryTime 
          22        2189        2167        2804 
 
UAV LIST FOR GS1: 
     3     1     5     9     9 
 
UAV LIST FOR GS2: 
     1     1     2     2     5 
 
UAV LIST FOR GS3: 
     9     4 
 
    AvgDist(m)   AvgTime(s)  Dist_std(m)  Time_std(s) 






RESULTS FROM THE ROBUSTNESS 
Records for the disconnected UAV: 
UAV Disconnected = 1 
Time it got eliminated = 50 
Time it recovered = 4400 
Its latest task delivery time = 2581 
Tasks in its tasklist are: 
     4     2     3 
 
Tasks delivered are: 
None 
Tasks undelivered are: 




TIME AT WHICH THE REAUCTION OF TASKS FROM THE DISCONNECTED 
UAV BEGINS: 2586 
THE REMAINING TASKS TO BE DONE BY ALL THE OTHER UAV JUS T 
BEFORE THE REAUCTION OF TASKS FROM THE DISCONNECTED, UAV1:  
The remaining tasks for UAV 2  are: None 
The remaining tasks for UAV 3  are: None 
The remaining tasks for UAV 4  are: None 
The remaining tasks for UAV 5  are: None 
The remaining tasks for UAV 6  are: None 
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The remaining tasks for UAV 7  are: None 
The remaining tasks for UAV 8  are: None 
The remaining tasks for UAV 9  are: None 
UAVs current coordinates just before the reauction of tasks from the eliminated UAV: 
  -353   361   158 
  -115   200     0 
   232     1     1 
  -115  -200     0 
   232     1     0 
   -52  -144   111 
  -115  -180   106 
  -115  -180   119 
   232     1     2 
 
GSs and UAVs bid pairs: 
           GS       GS_Bid       UAV      UAV_Bid 
     1   Inf     2   503 
     2   524     1   425 
     3   Inf     1   450 
 
GSs and UAVs bid pairs: 
           GS       GS_Bid       UAV      UAV_Bid 
           1        1105           2        1038 
           2        1101           2        1036 
           3         Inf           2        1074 
 
GSs and UAVs bid pairs: 
           GS       GS_Bid       UAV      UAV_Bid 
           1        1077           2         907 
           2         Inf           2         945 
           3        1085           2         911 
 
RECORDS FOR UAVs WHICH WON REAUCTIONED TASK(S):  




Task completed before REAUCTION: 
Task completed after REAUCTION: 
     4 
 
Minimum Route from start to end: 
     1     4     2 
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StartTime  DeliveryTime  PathTime LatestDeliveryTime 




Task completed before REAUCTION: 
     6     5 
Task completed after REAUCTION: 
     2     3 
 
Minimum Route from start to end: 
     2     6     5     2     3     1 
 
StartTime  DeliveryTime  PathTime LatestDeliveryTime 
          22        4356        2493        1868 
 
UAV LIST FOR GS1: 
     3     5     9     9     2 
 
UAV LIST FOR GS2: 
     2     2     5     1     2 
 
UAV LIST FOR GS3: 
     9     4 
 
    AvgDist(m)   AvgTime(s)  Dist_std(m)  Time_std(s) 




Ground Stations coordinates (in rows): 
   231     0     0 
  -115   200     0 
  -115  -200     0 
 




UAVs Initial Coordinates (in rows): 
    69 114 138 
   -97 210 100 
   -89 205 146 
    -8 -118 136 
   -58 -147 155 
    68 -74 160 
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  -115 -180 143 
  -115 -180 166 
  -115 -180 112 
 
 
20 Tasks  
Tasks coordinates (in rows): 
        3148        -613        4615 
        4706        -544        2990 
       -3731        2547        3855 
        4134        1551         405 
        4158        2655        1679 
        2922         853        2995 
        4058       -3374        1985 
        4595        -102         702 
         469        2094        4694 
        1324        4598        2906 
       -4025       -3132         954 
       -2215       -1185        3973 
        4576        2952        1917 
        3003       -2762        2119 
        -146       -3810        2533 
        -782        1463        2818 
        4572         -16         600 
       -3581       -2240        3871 
       -3424        1797        3072 
        4649       -1596        4214 
 
Ground Stations coordinates (in rows): 
   231     0     0 
  -115   200     0 






UAVs Initial Coordinates (in rows): 
    17   144   115 
    37   132   139 
   131   -38   113 
   146   -29   153 
  -115  -180   177 





Tasks coordinates (in rows): 
        2073         832         759 
        2297        4431        1144 
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        2802       -3897        1470 
       -2120        1407         433 
       -1624        2492        2422 
         261        1538        1028 
       -1035        2227        3860 
        1926        1837         503 
       -4385       -3825        2759 
        2814        2401        3910 
        1079       -1712        1941 






function DistTravelled = CalUAVDistance(UAV_Speed, 
TimeTaskStart,NegTIME,TaskDeliveryTime) 
            % Computes the instaneous distance travelled by UAV 
            % NegTIME is the instance at which negotiation is to happen 
         
            if NegTIME<=TimeTaskStart 
                DistTravelled = 0; 
            else 
                DistTravelled = 
UAV_Speed*(min(NegTIME,TaskDeliveryTime)-TimeTaskStart); 
            end 
            %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 
File CalUAVsNegBids 
function [UAVNegPath,PathCostNeg] = 
CalUAVsNegBids(DistTravel_UAVi,UAVi_MovingTo,... 
    
UAVj_MovingTo,GS_UAVi_RouteCords,GS_UAVj_RouteCords,UAVi_NewLocation,..
. 




%%% UAVi negotiating a task 
global TaskName 
UAVNegPath = []; 
PathCostNeg = inf; 
  
if DistTravel_UAVi>0 
    TaskToNeg_i = GS_UAVi_RouteCords(UAVi_MovingTo,:); 
    TaskName = GS_UAViRoutes(UAVi_MovingTo); 
    %%% compute the cost of the UAVs to the tasks 
   UAVi_NegBid = norm(TaskToNeg_i-UAVi_NewLocation)*DistUnitCost + 
norm(TaskToNeg_i-UAVi_NewLocation)*TimeUnitCost/UAV_Speed; % in USD  
   UAVj_NegBid = norm(TaskToNeg_i-UAVj_NewLocation)*DistUnitCost + 
norm(TaskToNeg_i-UAVj_NewLocation)*TimeUnitCost/UAV_Speed; % in USD 
   if UAVj_NegBid<UAVi_NegBid 
       TempUAVjRoute = [GS_UAVj_RouteCords(1:UAVj_MovingTo-
1,:);UAVj_NewLocation;TaskToNeg_i;GS_UAVj_RouteCords(1:UAVj_MovingTo,:)
]; 
       %%% computing the cost of the new path 
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       NegPathDist_j = ComputeNegPathDistance(TempUAVjRoute);  %% a 
function called to compute path distance 
        
       PathTimeNeg_j =  NegPathDist_j/UAV_Speed; 
       PathCostNeg =  NegPathDist_j*DistUnitCost + 
PathTimeNeg_j*TimeUnitCost; % in USD 
       TaskCompletionTimeNeg_j = TimeHistory(ROUTEid_j,1)+ 
PathTimeNeg_j; 
       if 
TaskCompletionTimeNeg_j<=TimeHistory(ROUTEid_j,3)&&TaskCompletionTimeNe
g_j<=Deadlines(TaskName) 
           UAVNegPath = TempUAVjRoute; 
          % GS_UAVi_RouteCords(UAVi_MovingTo,:) = []; 
       end 
   end 
end 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%       
       
%   %%% UAVj negotiating a task 
% if DistTravel_UAVj>0 
%     TaskToNeg_j = GS_UAVj_RouteCords(UAVj_MovingTo,:); 
%     %%% compute the cost of the UAVs to the tasks 
%    UAVj_NegBid = norm(TaskToNeg_j-UAVj_NewLocation)*DistUnitCost + 
norm(TaskToNeg_j-UAVj_NewLocation)*TimeUnitCost/UAV_Speed; % in USD  
%    UAVi_NegBid = norm(TaskToNeg_j-UAVi_NewLocation)*DistUnitCost + 
norm(TaskToNeg_j-UAVi_NewLocation)*TimeUnitCost/UAV_Speed; % in USD 
%    if UAVi_NegBid<UAVj_NegBid 
%        TempUAViRoute = [GS_UAVi_RouteCords(1:UAVi_MovingTo-
1,:);UAVi_NewLocation;TaskToNeg_j;GS_UAVi_RouteCords(1:UAVi_MovingTo,:)
]; 
%        %%% computing the cost of the new path 
%        NegPathDist_i = ComputeNegPathDistance(TempUAViRoute);  %% a 
function called to compute path distance 
%         
%        PathTimeNeg_i =  NegPathDist_i/UAV_Speed; 
%        PathCostNeg_i =  NegPathDist_i*DistUnitCost + 
PathTimeNeg_i*TimeUnitCost; % in USD 
%        TaskCompletionTimeNeg_i = TimeHistory(ROUTEid_i,1)+ 
PathTimeNeg_i; 
%        if TaskCompletionTimeNeg_i<=TimeHistory(ROUTEid_j,3) 
%            GS_UAVi_RouteCords = TempUAViRoute; 
%            GS_UAVj_RouteCords(UAVi_MovingTo,:) = []; 
%        end 
%    end 
% end   
       
 
File 
function NegPathDist = ComputeNegPathDistance(TempUAVRoute) 
% computes the distance of the new path formed by adding a new task 
from 
% another UAV 
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NegPathDist = 0; 
for i =1:size(TempUAVRoute,1)-1 
    NegPathDist = NegPathDist + norm(TempUAVRoute(i+1,:)-
TempUAVRoute(i,:)); 
end 
     
 
File 
function [RouteLenghts,CumRouteLenghts] = 
ComputeSegmentDistance(GS_UAVRouteCordAll,GS_UAVRoutesAll) 
global GS_UAVCommStrength GS_CommRange UAV_CommRange; 
RouteLenghts = []; 
CumRouteLenghts = []; 
NumberOfRoutes = length(GS_UAVRoutesAll); 
for u=1:NumberOfRoutes 
    RouteLenghts{u}(:,1) = 0; 
    NumOfPoints = size(GS_UAVRouteCordAll{u},1); 
    %if NumOfPoints>2 % Avoid dealing with a route with no task 
    for r = 1:NumOfPoints-1 
    RouteLenghts{u}(:,r+1) = norm(GS_UAVRouteCordAll{u}(r+1,:)-
GS_UAVRouteCordAll{u}(r,:)); 
    end 
    RouteLenghts{u}(:,NumOfPoints)= RouteLenghts{u}(:,r+1)-(1-
GS_UAVCommStrength)*(GS_CommRange+UAV_CommRange); 
    CumRouteLenghts{u} = cumsum(RouteLenghts{u}); % zero included for 
reference purposes 
    %end 





function GS_Cord = CreateAllGroundStations(NumberOfGS, TI, 
TI_CommRange, GS_CommRange,Scenario) 
  
GS_AngleChange = 2*pi/NumberOfGS;  % Angular displacement between anay 
two GS from TI 
GS_Angle = [1:NumberOfGS].*GS_AngleChange; % The angles at which the 
Manager distributes the GS 
  
if Scenario ==1 
   GS_Angle = [0,pi/2,pi]; 
    % FAR APART 
    RADIUS = 0.9 *(TI_CommRange+GS_CommRange); 
    GS_X = RADIUS.*cos(GS_Angle)+ TI(:,1); 
    GS_Y = RADIUS.*sin(GS_Angle) + TI(:,2); 
elseif Scenario ==2 
    % INTERSECT  
   GS_X = [0, GS_CommRange,  -GS_CommRange ]+ TI(:,1); 
   GS_Y = [2*GS_CommRange, GS_CommRange,  GS_CommRange ] + TI(:,2); 
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elseif Scenario ==3 
    % TANGENT     
RADIUS = 2*GS_CommRange/sqrt(3); 
    GS_X = RADIUS.*cos(GS_Angle)+ TI(:,1); 
    GS_Y = RADIUS.*sin(GS_Angle) + TI(:,2); 
end 
  
GS_Z = zeros(1,NumberOfGS); 








% This function creates Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and displays them in 
such 
% a way that at each Ground Station(i.e. GS) has at least one UAV in 
its 
% communication range 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
     
    % The initial angles at which the UAVs are distributed from the TI 
    ChangeInTeta_TI = 2*pi/NumberOfUAVs; 
    Teta_TI_UAVs = [1:NumberOfUAVs].* ChangeInTeta_TI; % X-axis angle 
     
    Dist_TI_UAVs = UAVCommStrength*(TI_CommRange + UAV_CommRange); 
    UAV_X = cos(UAVAngleFromTI)*Dist_TI_UAVs.*cos(Teta_TI_UAVs) + 
TI(1,1); 
    UAV_Y = cos(UAVAngleFromTI)*Dist_TI_UAVs.*sin(Teta_TI_UAVs) + 
TI(1,2); 
    Z_Value = Dist_TI_UAVs.*sin(UAVAngleFromTI) + TI(1,3); 
    UAV_Z(:,1:NumberOfUAVs) = Z_Value; 
    UAVsAll = [UAV_X',UAV_Y',UAV_Z']; 
    
    
File 




GS_Angle = [0,2*pi/3, 4*pi/3]; 
RADIUS = 2*TangGS_CommRange/sqrt(3); % radius at which all three GSs 
are tangential 
GS_X = RADIUS.*cos(GS_Angle)+ TI(:,1); 
GS_Y = RADIUS.*sin(GS_Angle) + TI(:,2); 
GS_Z = zeros(1,NumberOfGS)+  TI(:,3); 
GS_Cord = [GS_X',GS_Y',GS_Z']; 
94 
  
if Scenario ==1      % FAR APART 
    GS_CommRange = GS_GS_CommStrength*TangGS_CommRange; 
elseif Scenario ==2  % INTERSECT 
    GS_CommRange = (1 + GS_GS_CommStrength)*TangGS_CommRange; 
elseif Scenario ==3 % TANGENT 
    GS_CommRange = TangGS_CommRange; 
end 
  





UAVTaskStartTime, UAVTaskEndTime] = 
DisplayUAVTaskList(WinnerUAV_Route,UAVs, GS_Cord, 
Task,WinnerPathTime,TaskCreationTimes) 
global UAVsNames Count GS_UAVRoutesAll Counter GS_UAVRouteCordAll 
Deadlines TimeHistory 
Route = []; 
Count = 0; 
UAVRouteCord = []; 
TimeForTaskExecution = []; 
ID_UAVs  = []; 
for m=1:length(WinnerUAV_Route) 
    if ~isempty(WinnerUAV_Route{m}) 
        Count = Count + 1; 
        Counter = Counter + 1; 
   UAVs_Route{Count} = WinnerUAV_Route{m}; 
   Route = UAVs_Route{Count}; 
   GS_UAVs_Route{Count} = UAVs_Route{Count}; 
   GS_UAVs_Route{Count}(1,1) = UAVsNames(Route(1)); 
   GS_UAVRoutesAll{Counter} = GS_UAVs_Route{Count}; 
   TimeForTaskExecution(Count) = round(WinnerPathTime(Route(1),:)); 
   TaskList =  Route(:,2:end-1);  
   UAVTaskStartTime(Count,:) = TaskCreationTimes(TaskList(1)); % time 
at which UAV begins executing task 
   UAVTaskEndTime(Count,:) = UAVTaskStartTime(Count,:) + 
TimeForTaskExecution(Count); % time at which UAV ends its task 
    
   disp(sprintf('The Task List for UAV %s  is: %s, Tasks start time is 
%d and Task delivery time is %.0d'... 
       ,num2str(UAVsNames(Route(1))), 
num2str(TaskList),UAVTaskStartTime(Count,:), UAVTaskEndTime(Count,:))) 
   UAVRouteCord{Count} = [UAVs(Route(1),:); Task(Route(2:end-
1),:);GS_Cord(Route(end),:)]; 
   ID_UAVs = [ID_UAVs;UAVsNames(Route(1))]; 
    
   LatestDeliveryTime = min(Deadlines(Route(2:end-1))); 
    
   GS_UAVRouteCordAll{Counter} = UAVRouteCord{Count}; 
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   TimeHistory(Counter,:) = [UAVTaskStartTime(Count,:), 
UAVTaskEndTime(Count,:),LatestDeliveryTime]; 









global  GS_CommRange UAV_CommRange GS_UAVCommStrength 
  
UAVNewLocation = []; 
LastTaskDone = 0; % no task is done  
if DistTravelled==0 
    UAVNewLocation = GS_UAVRouteCords(1,:); % UAV initial coordinate 
     PointMovingTo = 1; 
else 
for i =1:length(UAVCumRouteLenghts) 
    if DistTravelled < UAVCumRouteLenghts(i) 
        PointMovingTo = i;  
         
        DistFromPreviousPoint = DistTravelled - 
UAVCumRouteLenghts(PointMovingTo-1); 
        DirectionVector = GS_UAVRouteCords(PointMovingTo,:)-
GS_UAVRouteCords(PointMovingTo-1,:); 
        
        UAVNewLocation = GS_UAVRouteCords(PointMovingTo-1,:) + 
(DistFromPreviousPoint/RouteLenghts(PointMovingTo))*DirectionVector; 
      
     if PointMovingTo > 2  
     LastTaskDone = PointMovingTo - 2; % number of tasks done (Note: 
not necesarily task IDs) 
      end 
        break; 




     
      
     DirectionVector = GS_UAVRouteCords(end,:)-GS_UAVRouteCords(end-
1,:); 
     DistFromPreviousPoint = norm(GS_UAVRouteCords(end,:)-
GS_UAVRouteCords(end-1,:))-(1-
GS_UAVCommStrength)*(GS_CommRange+UAV_CommRange);  
      
     UAVNewLocation = GS_UAVRouteCords(end-1,:) + 
(DistFromPreviousPoint/DistFromPreviousPoint)*DirectionVector; % UAV 
has finished its tasks and arrived at the GS 
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%      UAVNewLocation = GS_UAVRouteCords(end,:); % UAV has finished its 
tasks and arrived at the GS 
     LastTaskDone = length(UAVCumRouteLenghts) - 2; % 2, because we 
have one UAV and one GS coordinates 
     PointMovingTo = length(UAVCumRouteLenghts); 
end 





function RandUAVs =  
GenerateRandUAVs(NumberOfGS,NumberOfUAVs,GS_Cord,TangGS_CommRange,UAV_C
ommRangeMin) 
Lines = nchoosek(1:NumberOfGS,2); % lines connecting the centre of the 
GSs 
NumOfLines = size(Lines,1); 
  
NumOfRandUAV = zeros(1,NumOfLines); 
NumOfRandUAV(1:NumOfLines-1) = 
repmat(floor(NumberOfUAVs/NumberOfGS),1,NumOfLines-1); 
NumOfRandUAV(NumOfLines) = NumberOfUAVs - 
sum(NumOfRandUAV(1:NumOfLines-1)); %% Last GS pair takes the remaining 
UAVs 
TempUAVs  = []; 
for i=1:NumOfLines 
    x1 = GS_Cord(Lines(i,1),1); 
    y1 = GS_Cord(Lines(i,1),2); 
    x2 = GS_Cord(Lines(i,2),1); 
    y2 = GS_Cord(Lines(i,2),2); 
    if max(x1,x2)-min(x1,x2)< NumOfRandUAV(i) 
    UAV_X = repmat(min(x1,x2),1,NumOfRandUAV(i)); 
        else 
    UAV_X = randsample(min(x1,x2):max(x1,x2),NumOfRandUAV(i)); 
    end 
    UAV_Y  = ((y2- y1)/(x2-x1)).*(UAV_X-x1)+ y1 + 0.1*TangGS_CommRange; 
    UAV_Z  = randsample(0.5*TangGS_CommRange:0.4*(TangGS_CommRange + 
UAV_CommRangeMin),NumOfRandUAV(i)); 
    TempUAVs = [TempUAVs ;[UAV_X',UAV_Y',UAV_Z']]; 
end 
RandUAVs = TempUAVs; 
FileName = 
strcat(num2str(NumberOfUAVs),'RandUAVs_',num2str(UAV_CommRangeMin)); 




UAVsCommWithGS{NumberOfGS} = [];  
for g=1:NumberOfGS 
     
DistOfUAVfromGS = sqrt(sum((bsxfun(@minus, GS_Cord(g,:), 
RandUAVs)).^2,2)); 
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% Temp = find(DistOfUAVfromGS<=(TangGS_CommRange + UAV_CommRangeMin)); 
for j=1:NumberOfUAVs 
        if DistOfUAVfromGS(j)<=(TangGS_CommRange + UAV_CommRangeMin) 
            UAVsCommWithGS{g} = [UAVsCommWithGS{g},j]; 
%             break 




disp('COMMUNICATION BETWEEN GSs and UAVs') 
for g=1:NumberOfGS 






function RandTasks = GenerateTask() 
UAV_CommRangeMax = 2500; 




Ymax = 2*UAV_CommRangeMax; 
Zmin = 0;%TangGS_CommRange+UAV_CommRangeMin; 
Zmax  = 2*UAV_CommRangeMax; 
X_Cords = randsample(Xmin:Xmax, NumOfTasks); 
Y_Cords = randsample(Ymin:Ymax, NumOfTasks); 
Z_Cords = randsample(Zmin:Zmax, NumOfTasks); 
RandTasks = [X_Cords',Y_Cords',Z_Cords']; 
FileName = strcat('RandTasks_',num2str(NumOfTasks)); 








% This function computes the the cost for Ground Station(GS) to perform 
a given 
% task and makes a list of the tasks won by each GS 
GS_Bids = []; 
Po = []; 
Alpha = 0.5; % 0<Alpha<1 
for i=1:NumberOfGS 
    %      CommCheck = norm(TI- GS_Cord(i,:)); % checking to see if GS 
and TI are in communication range 
    %      if CommCheck<=(TI_CommRange + GS_CommRange) 
%     GS_TaskDist = norm(Task-GS_Cord(i,:)); % distance between the 
task and the ground station 
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%     GS_TaskDistCost = DistUnitCost*(GS_TaskDist); % (in USD) % Take 
note 
%     GS_TaskTime = GS_TaskDist/UAV_Speed; 
%     TGS_TaskTimeCost = GS_TaskTime*TimeUnitCost;  % (in USD) 
%     Po(:,i) =  2*(GS_TaskDistCost + TGS_TaskTimeCost);  %2*norm(Task-
GS_Cord(i,:))*DistUnitCost; % price from the task 
    Po(:,i) = 2*(norm(Task-GS_Cord(i,:))*DistUnitCost + norm(Task-
GS_Cord(i,:))*TimeUnitCost/UAV_Speed); % cost in USD 
     
%     GS_Cost = Alpha*Po(:,i) + (GS_TaskDistCost + 
TGS_TaskTimeCost)*(1-Alpha); % GS bid for a task 
     
    GS_Cost  = Po(:,i); 
     
    if GS_Cost<=TI_TaskCost(Task_id) 
        GS_Bids(:,i) =  GS_Cost; %GS_Bids(:,i); %GS_Cost; 
    else 
        GS_Bids(:,i) = Inf; 
    end 
end 




function PlotTheSpaceWithTheAgents(GS_Cord, GS_CommRange, 
NumberOfGS,TI_CommRange, TI,UAVs,NumberOfUAVs) 
figure('Name','GS and TI communication ranges, Tasks and UAVs') 
plot3(UAVs(:,1),UAVs(:,2),UAVs(:,3),'*') 















for i =1:NumberOfGS 
    % use to plot a circle for the GS communication ranges 
    N =256; 
t = (0:N)*2*pi/N; 



















% The function tries to distribute the tasks for a given UAV to other 
UAVs 
function Robustness(UAV_ID_Eliminate, UAV_Elimination_Time, 
UAVRecoveryTime, GS_UAVRoutesAll,... 
    TimeHistory, GS_UAVRouteCordAll, 
UAVTasksCompletionDurations,AllTaskDeadlines) 
% GS_UAVRoutesAll contains all the UAVs' routes (i.e. from UAV->Task-
>GS) 
% TimeHistory contains the task start time , delivery time and the 
latest 
% time the task could be delivered without timeout 
% UAV_ID_Eliminate is UAV to be eliminated due to injury 
% UAVRecoveryTime > UAV_Disconnection_Time 
global TI_CostScalar InitNumberOfTask CycleAuctionCloseTime 
tH_Robust = AllTaskDeadlines; 
% Making sure the  UAVRecoveryTime and UAV_Disconnection_Time are valid 
while (UAVRecoveryTime < UAV_Elimination_Time) 
    disp('UAVRecoveryTime must be more than UAV_Elimination_Time and 
both must be greater than zero') 
    UAV_Elimination_Time = input('Please enter UAV_Elimination_Time:    
'); 




global GS_CommRange NumberOfGS TI_CommRange TI UAV_CommRange GS_History  
Task UAV_Speed WinnerUAV_RouteOld TangGS_CommRange 
GS_UAVCommStrength... 
    DistUnitCost TimeUnitCost NumberOfUAVs TaskAuctionTimesOld GS_Cord 
Up AuctionTimeStep TI_id WinnerPathTimeOld GS_UAVList UAVs 
 global SellAndBuyBids M_BuyBid SellAndBuyWinners SellAndBuyWinnerBids 
TI_TaskCost GS_jUAV_SBids TaskCreationTime Scenario Gamma OriginalUAV 
OriginalGS 
  
% Note: Gamma is a fraction of latest delivery time of task by 
eliminated UAV 
NumberOfUAVsAll = NumberOfUAVs; 
% Find the UAV to be disconnected 
UAVs_CurrentLocations = zeros(NumberOfUAVsAll,3); 
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UAVsWithTasks = []; 
RemainingPathTime = UAVTasksCompletionDurations; 
%zeros(NumberOfUAVsAll,1); 
DeadTimes = zeros(NumberOfUAVsAll,1); 
UAV_TaskListRemaining = [];  % tasks unvisisted prior to the UAV's 
disconnection 
 NumOfTasks = zeros(NumberOfUAVsAll,1); 
for j = 1: length(GS_UAVRoutesAll) 
        if ~isempty(GS_UAVRoutesAll{j}) 
    NumOfTasks(j,:) = length(GS_UAVRoutesAll{j}) - 2; % stores the 
number of tasks in the tasklist of each UAV 
%     UAVsWithTasks   = [UAVsWithTasks; GS_UAVRoutesAll{j}(1)];  % UAV 
IDS basically 
     
    DeadTimes(GS_UAVRoutesAll{j}(1),:) = 
min(AllTaskDeadlines(GS_UAVRoutesAll{j}(2:end-1))); % stores the time 
for the last auctioned tasks for each route 
    %     GS_id(j,:) = GS_UAVRoutesAll{j}(end); 
        else 
          UAVs_CurrentLocations(j,:) =  UAVs(j,:);  % UAV  does not 
move if it wins no task 





% Checking to make sure the UAV entered is valid and has some task(s) 
ValidUAV_IDChecker = 0; 
while (ValidUAV_IDChecker==0) 
%     ROUTEidToDelete = find( UAVsWithTasks == UAV_ID_Eliminate); 
    if isempty(GS_UAVRoutesAll{UAV_ID_Eliminate}) 
        disp('The UAV you have entered does not exist or has no task; 
taking it out has no impact on the system.') 
        UAV_ID_Eliminate = input('Please enter another UAVid (any 
number from 1 through 9):   '); % There are 9 UAVs 
        ValidUAV_IDChecker = 0; 
    else 
        ValidUAV_IDChecker = 1; 
        ROUTEidToDelete = UAV_ID_Eliminate; 




RouteToDelete = GS_UAVRoutesAll{ROUTEidToDelete}; % contains the UAV, 
its tasks, and the GS to deliver to 
  
TasksForUAV_ID_Eliminate = RouteToDelete(2:end-1); % Task IDs from the 
eliminated UAV 
% NumOfTasks = length(TasksForUAV_ID_Eliminate); 
LatestTasksDeliveryTime = TimeHistory(ROUTEidToDelete, 4);  
TimeToReAuctionTasks = round((1 + Gamma)*LatestTasksDeliveryTime); % 
time to restart auctioning taks from the eliminated UAV 
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TimeToBeginReAuctionTasks = TimeToReAuctionTasks; 
% Compute the new location of the UAV prior to its elimination (i.e. 
deletion) 
DistByUAV_ID_Eliminate = CalUAVDistance(UAV_Speed, 
TimeHistory(ROUTEidToDelete,1),UAV_Elimination_Time,TimeHistory(ROUTEid
ToDelete,2)); 
Temp1{1} = GS_UAVRouteCordAll{ROUTEidToDelete};  % take note of 
{RouteToDelete}; 
Temp2{1} = GS_UAVRoutesAll{ROUTEidToDelete};     % take note of 
{RouteToDelete}; 
  
[RouteLenghts,UAVCumRouteLenghts] = ComputeSegmentDistance(Temp1, 
Temp2); 
  
Temp3  = GS_UAVRouteCordAll{ROUTEidToDelete};    % take note of 
{RouteToDelete}; 
Temp4 = UAVCumRouteLenghts{1}; 
Temp5 = RouteLenghts{1}; 
[UAVNewLocation1, PointMovingTo, LastTaskDone] = 
FindUAVnewLocation(Temp4, Temp3, Temp5,DistByUAV_ID_Eliminate); 
  
% Compute UAV new location after the UAV has recovered and moved 
towards 
% the remaining tasks 
if UAVRecoveryTime < TimeToReAuctionTasks 
    EarliestExpDeliveryTime = 
TimeHistory(ROUTEidToDelete,2)+(UAVRecoveryTime-UAV_Elimination_Time); 
    DistByUAV_ID_Eliminate2 = CalUAVDistance(UAV_Speed, 
UAVRecoveryTime, TimeToReAuctionTasks,EarliestExpDeliveryTime); 
    TotalDist = DistByUAV_ID_Eliminate + DistByUAV_ID_Eliminate2; 
    [UAVNewLocation2, PointMovingTo, LastTaskDone] = 
FindUAVnewLocation(Temp4, Temp3, Temp5, TotalDist); 
    UAVs_CurrentLocations(UAV_ID_Eliminate, :) = UAVNewLocation2; 
else 
    UAVs_CurrentLocations(UAV_ID_Eliminate, :) = UAVNewLocation1; 




UAV_GS_CommChecker = UAV_CommRange + GS_CommRange; 
Store1 = GS_UAVRouteCordAll{ROUTEidToDelete}(end,:); % GS co-ordinates 
if (LastTaskDone>0) && (LastTaskDone < NumOfTasks(ROUTEidToDelete)) 
&&((norm(Store1- UAVNewLocation2)<=(UAV_GS_CommChecker))) % check 
communication 
    TasksUnDelivered = TasksForUAV_ID_Eliminate(LastTaskDone+1:end); % 
these tasks have to be re-auctioned to the existing UAVs 
elseif LastTaskDone < 1 
    TasksUnDelivered = TasksForUAV_ID_Eliminate; 
elseif (LastTaskDone==NumOfTasks(ROUTEidToDelete)) && 
((norm(GS_UAVRouteCordAll{ROUTEidToDelete}(end,:)- 
UAVNewLocation2)<=(UAV_GS_CommChecker))) 
    TasksUnDelivered = []; % all tasks are delivered. 
else 
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% Display some statistics for the disconnected UAV 
disp('Records for the disconnected UAV:') 
  
disp(sprintf('UAV Disconnected = %d', UAV_ID_Eliminate)) 
disp(sprintf('Time it got eliminated = %d', UAV_Elimination_Time)) 
disp(sprintf('Time it recovered = %d', UAVRecoveryTime)) 
disp(sprintf('Its latest task delivery time = %d', 
LatestTasksDeliveryTime)) 
disp('Tasks in its tasklist are:') 
disp(TasksForUAV_ID_Eliminate) 
disp('Tasks delivered are:') 
if isempty(TasksDelivered) 
    disp('None') 
else 




disp('Tasks undelivered are:') 
if isempty(TasksUnDelivered) 
    disp('none') 
else 










% Computing the remaining tasks to be done by the existing UAVs at the 
point of reauctioning of the tasks undelivered by the disconnected UAV 
  
% Initialize the task lists 
 UAV_TaskListRemaining{NumberOfUAVsAll} = []; 
%  UAV_TaskListRemaining{UAV_ID_Eliminate} = TasksUnDelivered; 
 RemainingPathTime = zeros(NumberOfUAVsAll,1); %initialization  
%  WinnerUAV_Route{NumberOfUAVsAll} = []; 
 UAV_TaskListCompleted{NumberOfUAVsAll} = []; 




% Find the remaining tasks for UAVs with tasks 
 TaskAuctionTimes = zeros(InitNumberOfTask,1); 
 WinnerPathTimeOld = zeros(NumberOfUAVsAll,1); 
 last =[]; 
for j = 1: NumberOfUAVsAll %length(UAVsWithTasks) 
    if j~=UAV_ID_Eliminate % avoid doing for eliminated UAV 
        if ~isempty(GS_UAVRoutesAll{j}) 
            Distance = CalUAVDistance(UAV_Speed, TimeHistory(j,1), 
TimeToReAuctionTasks,TimeHistory(j,2)); 
             
            Temp6{1} = GS_UAVRouteCordAll{j}; 
            Temp7{1} = GS_UAVRoutesAll{j}; 
             
            [RouteLenghts,UAVCumRouteLenghts] = 
ComputeSegmentDistance(Temp6, Temp7); 
%              [j,Distance,UAVCumRouteLenghts{1}(end)] 
            [UAVs_CurrentLocations(j,:), PointMovingTo, LastTaskDone] = 
FindUAVnewLocation(UAVCumRouteLenghts{1}, GS_UAVRouteCordAll{j}, 
RouteLenghts{1},Distance); 
              
            if LastTaskDone>0 && LastTaskDone <= NumOfTasks(j) 
                UAV_TaskListCompleted{j} = 
GS_UAVRoutesAll{j}(2:LastTaskDone+1); 
                GS_UAVRoutesAll{j}(2:LastTaskDone+1) = []; % delete 
tasks IDs visited 
                UAV_TaskListRemaining{j} = GS_UAVRoutesAll{j}(2:end-1); 
% UAV_TaskListRemaining contains remaining task to be done 
                GS_UAVRouteCordAll{j}(2:LastTaskDone+1, :) = []; % 
delete the coordinates of tasks visited 
                WinnerPathTimeOld(j) = 
min(TimeToReAuctionTasks,TimeHistory(j,2))-TimeHistory(j,1); % time 
already travelled. 
%                 last = [last; [j  NumOfTasks(j) LastTaskDone  
UAV_TaskListRemaining{j}]] 
            elseif LastTaskDone==0 
                UAV_TaskListRemaining{j} = GS_UAVRoutesAll{j}(2:end-1); 
                 
                 UAV_TaskListCompleted{j} = []; 
%                  WinnerPathTimeOld(j) = TimeToReAuctionTasks-
TimeHistory(j,1); % time elapsed. 
            end 
             
            if TimeToReAuctionTasks < TimeHistory(j,2) % less than 
earliest delivery time 
                RemainingPathTime(j,:) =  TimeHistory(j,2) - 
TimeToReAuctionTasks; % time remaining to be travelled. 
            end 
            
        else 
            UAV_TaskListRemaining{j} = []; 
        end 
104 
    end 




%  WinnerPathTimeOld(4) 
RemainingPathTime(UAV_ID_Eliminate,:) =  
TimeHistory(UAV_ID_Eliminate,2) - UAV_Elimination_Time; % time 
remaining to be travelled. 
  
UAV_TaskListRemaining{UAV_ID_Eliminate} = []; % the remaining tasks for 
the deleted UAV are the undelivered tasks 
WinnerPathTimeOld( UAV_ID_Eliminate) = UAV_Elimination_Time - 
TimeHistory(UAV_ID_Eliminate,1); % time already travelled. 
% WinnerPathTimeOld( UAV_ID_Eliminate) = 
TimeHistory(UAV_ID_Eliminate,2) - TimeHistory(UAV_ID_Eliminate,1); 
  
disp(sprintf('TIME AT WHICH THE REAUCTION OF TASKS FROM THE 
DISCONNECTED UAV BEGINS: %s', 
num2str(round(TimeToBeginReAuctionTasks)))) 
disp(sprintf('THE REMAINING TASKS TO BE DONE BY ALL THE OTHER UAV JUST 
BEFORE THE REAUCTION OF TASKS FROM THE DISCONNECTED, UAV%s:', 
num2str(UAV_ID_Eliminate))) 
for i=1:NumberOfUAVsAll 
    if i~=UAV_ID_Eliminate % avoid doing for eliminated UAV 
        if isempty(UAV_TaskListRemaining{i}) 
            disp(sprintf('The remaining tasks for UAV %s  are: %s', 
num2str(i), 'None')) 
            GS_UAVRoutesAll{i} = []; 
        else 
            disp(sprintf('The remaining tasks for UAV %s  are: %s', 
num2str(i), num2str(UAV_TaskListRemaining{i}))) 
            TaskAuctionTimes(UAV_TaskListRemaining{i}) = 
TimeToReAuctionTasks + (0:length(UAV_TaskListRemaining{i})-
1).*AuctionTimeStep; 
        end 
    end 
end 
GS_UAVRoutesAll{UAV_ID_Eliminate} = []; % deleted UAV has no route 




disp('UAVs current coordinates just before the reauction of tasks from 









% The reauctioning of the undelivered tasks from the disconnected UAVs 
  
PreviousGSTaskAuctionTimes = TaskAuctionTimes; % keeps the times the 
tasks were originally sold to the UAVs. 
for gs=1:NumberOfGS 
    TempGS_UAVlist = GS_UAVList{gs}; 
    GS(gs).UAV_Route = GS_UAVRoutesAll; 
    TempGS_UAVlist(find(TempGS_UAVlist==UAV_ID_Eliminate))=[]; 
    GS_UAVList{gs} = TempGS_UAVlist; % deleted UAV eliminated 
end 
WinnerUAV_Route = GS_UAVRoutesAll; % New UAV routes ( initialization ) 
WinnerPathTime  = RemainingPathTime; % initialization 
  
UAV_TaskListNew = UAV_TaskListRemaining; 
  
if isempty(TasksUnDelivered) 
    ReauctionCloseTime = 0; 
    disp('All the tasks have already been delivered by the disconnected 
UAV before the reauctioning time') 
else 
    Start_t = TimeToBeginReAuctionTasks - AuctionTimeStep; % 
initialization 
%     GS_UAVList{NumberOfGS} =  []; % initialization 
    WinnerUAVsIDs = []; 
    UAVsBids = []; 
    CycleCount = 0; 
        
    UnsoldTaskIDs = TasksUnDelivered; 
    InitReAuctioneTimes(UnsoldTaskIDs) = TimeToReAuctionTasks + 
(0:length(UnsoldTaskIDs)-1).*AuctionTimeStep; % For initial undelivered 
tasks 
    while(1) % do until all tasks are re-auctioned 
        CycleCount = CycleCount + 1; 
        NumberOfTask(CycleCount) = length(UnsoldTaskIDs); 
        UnsoldTaskIDsTemp = []; 
         
        for i = 1: NumberOfTask(CycleCount) 
            TaskID = UnsoldTaskIDs(i); 
            NewTask_id = TaskID; 
            Start_t = Start_t + AuctionTimeStep;  % note, Start_t 
starts from TimeToReAuctionTasks and it is basically task re-auctioned 
time 
            TaskAuctionTimes(TaskID) = Start_t; % 
             
            AllTaskDeadlines(TaskID,:) =  AllTaskDeadlines(TaskID) + 
Start_t - max(UAV_Elimination_Time, TimeHistory(ROUTEidToDelete,1));   
% task deadlines have been readjusted 
            NewTaskDeadline =  AllTaskDeadlines(TaskID); 
             
            %Compute the cost of the task to be auctioned 
            t = TaskAuctionTimes(TaskID)-InitReAuctioneTimes(TaskID); 
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            TI_Po(:,TaskID) = 2*(norm(TI-Task(TaskID,:))*DistUnitCost + 
norm(TI-Task(TaskID,:))*TimeUnitCost/UAV_Speed); % initial price from 
the task initiator 
  
            TI_TaskCost(TaskID,:) = TI_CostScalar*TI_Po(:,TaskID)*(1 + 
Up*t/tH_Robust(TaskID)); 
            GS_Bids{TaskID} = GS_Bidding(NumberOfGS, TI, 
Task(TaskID,:),GS_Cord,TI_CommRange,GS_CommRange,UAV_Speed,DistUnitCost
,TimeUnitCost,TI_TaskCost,TaskID); % sell bids 
             
            % Computing the UAVs Biddings and the optimize path as well 
            UAVwinnerBids  = zeros(1,NumberOfGS); 
            WinnerUAVnames = zeros(1,NumberOfGS); 
            GSs_UAVs_BidPairs = zeros(NumberOfGS,4); 
            GSnames = 1:NumberOfGS; 
             
            AllUAVNames =  1: NumberOfUAVsAll; % initialization 
            if UAVRecoveryTime < Start_t 
                for gs = 1:NumberOfGS 
                    UAV_Bids{TaskID}(UAV_ID_Eliminate) = inf; 
                    GS(gs).UAV_Route{UAV_ID_Eliminate} = []; 
                    GS(gs).PathTime(UAV_ID_Eliminate,:) = inf; 
                end 
                AllUAVNames(UAV_ID_Eliminate)=[];  % to prevent the 
deleted UAV from bidding 
            end 
             
            for gs = 1:NumberOfGS 
                UAV_Bid = []; 
                for j=1: length(AllUAVNames) %NumberOfUAVsAll                         
                    UAVID =  AllUAVNames(j); 
                    
%                     if UAVID==UAV_ID_Eliminate && UAVRecoveryTime < 
Start_t 
%                         UAV_Bids{TaskID}(UAVID) = inf; 
GS(gs).UAV_Route{UAVID} = []; GS(gs).PathTime(UAVID,:) = inf; % to 
prevent the deleted UAV from bidding 
%                     else 
                         
                        if isempty(UAV_TaskListNew{UAVID}) 
                            UAV_TaskListPrevious = []; 
                            NewLeastPathTime = 0; 
                            OldTaskDeadline = 0; 
                            oldGS_ID = 0; 
                            
[UAV_Bids{TaskID}(UAVID),GS(gs).UAV_Route{UAVID},GS(gs).PathTime(UAVID)
] =  UAV_Bidding(UAV_TaskListPrevious, TI, 
TI_id,UAVID,UAVs_CurrentLocations,Task,UAV_Speed,TI_TaskCost,... 
                                
TaskID,DistUnitCost,TimeUnitCost,NewLeastPathTime,NewTaskDeadline,... 
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OldTaskDeadline,GS_CommRange,UAV_CommRange, 
TaskAuctionTimes,GS_Cord,gs,oldGS_ID); 
                        elseif ~isempty(UAV_TaskListNew{UAVID}) 
                            UAV_TaskListPrevious = 
UAV_TaskListNew{UAVID}; 
                            NewLeastPathTime = WinnerPathTime(UAVID); 
                            %                         OldTaskDeadline = 
DeadTimes(UAVID); 
                            oldGS_ID = WinnerUAV_Route{UAVID}(end); 
%                            bb =  GS(gs).UAV_Route{UAVID}(end-1) 
                            OldTaskDeadline =  
min(AllTaskDeadlines(UAV_TaskListNew{UAVID})); 
%AllTaskDeadlines(GS(gs).UAV_Route{UAVID}(end-1)); 
                            
[UAV_Bids{TaskID}(UAVID),GS(gs).UAV_Route{UAVID},GS(gs).PathTime(UAVID)
] =  UAV_Bidding(UAV_TaskListPrevious, TI, 
TI_id,UAVID,UAVs_CurrentLocations,Task,UAV_Speed,TI_TaskCost,... 
                                
TaskID,DistUnitCost,TimeUnitCost,NewLeastPathTime,NewTaskDeadline,... 
                                
OldTaskDeadline,GS_CommRange,UAV_CommRange, 
TaskAuctionTimes,GS_Cord,gs,oldGS_ID); 
                        end 
                         
%                     end 
                end 
                [UAVwinnerBids(gs), WinnerUAVnames(gs)] = 
min(UAV_Bids{TaskID}); 
            end 
             
            GSs_UAVs_BidPairs = [GSnames',round(GS_Bids{TaskID}'), 
WinnerUAVnames',round(UAVwinnerBids')]; 
            disp('GSs and UAVs bid pairs:') 
            disp('           GS       GS_Bid       UAV      UAV_Bid') 
            disp(GSs_UAVs_BidPairs) 
            %       UAV_Bids{i} 
             
            
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
             
            % Matching the GS_Bids (i.e. sell bids) and the UAV_Bids 
(i.e. buy 
            % bids 
            Sell_in_Bids = []; 
            Buy_in_Bids  = []; 
            TransactionSet = []; 
            UAV_Indx = []; 
            GS_Indx = []; 
            UAV_Indx1 = []; 
            GS_Indx1 = []; 
             
            % Determine eligible sellers and buyers 
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            for m=1:NumberOfGS 
                if GS_Bids{TaskID}(m)~=Inf && UAVwinnerBids(m)~=Inf 
                    TransactionSet = [TransactionSet; 
[GS_Bids{TaskID}(m),UAVwinnerBids(m)]]; 
                    UAV_Indx1 = [UAV_Indx1; WinnerUAVnames(m)]; 
                    GS_Indx1 = [GS_Indx1; m]; 
                end 
            end 
            %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
             
            NumOfSellers = size(TransactionSet,1); 
            if ~isempty(TransactionSet) % There are seller(s) and 
buyer(s) 
                [ignore1 OrigIndx] = min(TransactionSet(:,1)); 
                OriginalUAVtemp = UAV_Indx1(OrigIndx); 
                OriginalGStemp  = GS_Indx1(OrigIndx); 
                 
                Rank = sort([TransactionSet(:,1), 
TransactionSet(:,2)],'ascend'); 
                M_BuyBid(TaskID,:) = Rank(NumOfSellers);  % Mth bid 
                M_nextBuyBid(TaskID,:) = Rank(NumOfSellers+1); % M+1st 
bid 
                 
                [Sell_Bids{TaskID}, GS_IndxTemp{TaskID}] = 
min(TransactionSet(:,1)); 
                GS_Indx(1)  = GS_Indx1(GS_IndxTemp{TaskID}); % winner 
GS(i.e. GS with minimum bid) 
                UAV_Indx(1) = UAV_Indx1(GS_IndxTemp{TaskID});  % winner 
UAV (i.e. UAV with minimum bid) 
                 
                Buy_Bids{TaskID} = 
TransactionSet(GS_IndxTemp{TaskID},2); 
                %                 GS_Winner = 
GS_Indx1(GS_IndxTemp{TaskID}); % actual winner 
                                GS_jUAV_SBids(TaskID) = 
GS_Bids{TaskID}(GS_Indx(1)); % cost of GS to which task is delivered 
%                 GS_TaskDelivered(TaskID) = GS_Indx(1); 
                 
                %%%Determine the winner 
                UAV_TaskListNew{UAV_Indx(1)}    = 
[UAV_TaskListNew{UAV_Indx(1)}, TaskID]; 
                GS_UAVList{GS_Indx(1)}       = [GS_UAVList{GS_Indx(1)}, 
UAV_Indx(1)]; 
                WinnerUAV_Route{UAV_Indx(1)} = 
GS(GS_Indx(1)).UAV_Route{UAV_Indx(1)}; 
                WinnerPathTime(UAV_Indx(1))  = 
GS(GS_Indx(1)).PathTime(UAV_Indx(1)); 
                SellAndBuyBids(TaskID,:)     = 
SellAndBuyWinnerBids(TaskID,:); %winning sell and buy bids pair 
                SellAndBuyWinners(TaskID,:) =  [GS_Indx(1), 
UAV_Indx(1)]; % UAVs and GSs that win the tasks 
                SellAndBuyWinnerBids(TaskID,:) = [Sell_Bids{TaskID}, 
Buy_Bids{TaskID}]; 
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                SellAndBuyBids(TaskID,:) =     
SellAndBuyWinnerBids(TaskID,:); 
                 
                OriginalUAV(TaskID) = OriginalUAVtemp; % UAV with 
minimum cost 
                OriginalGS(TaskID)  = OriginalGStemp;  % GS paired with 
UAV with minimu cost 
            else % there are no sellers and/or buyers 
                UnsoldTaskIDsTemp = [UnsoldTaskIDsTemp,TaskID]; 
            end 
        end 
        TransactionSet = []; 
         
        % Check if all tasks are sold 
        if isempty(UnsoldTaskIDsTemp) 
            break; % break from the while loop 
        else 
            UnsoldTaskIDs = UnsoldTaskIDsTemp; % tasks unsolds 
        end 
%         UnsoldTaskIDs 
    end 
    ReauctionCloseTime =  Start_t;  % time at which the reauction of 




%Display the final routes for UAVs which won some reauctioned tasks 
UAVTasksStartTimes = []; 
  
% disp('THE ROUTES FOR THE BUSY (THOSE WHICH HAD TASKS) UAVs FROM THE 
TIME THE UNDELIVERED TASKS ARE REAUCTIONED:') 
% for i=1: NumberOfUAVsAll 
%     if ~isempty(WinnerUAV_Route{i}) 
%         %      UAVTasksStartTimes = [UAVTasksStartTimes; 
GSTaskAuctionedTimes(WinnerUAV_Route{i}(2))]; 
%         disp(WinnerUAV_Route{i}) 
%         disp(sprintf('Tasks begin at %s,  delivered at %s', 
num2str(TaskAuctionTimes(WinnerUAV_Route{i}(2))),... 
%             num2str(round(WinnerPathTime(i)+ 
TaskAuctionTimes(WinnerUAV_Route{i}(2)))))) 
%         disp(sprintf('\n')) 




TaskAuctionTimes(TasksUnDelivered); % Replace the aution times for the 
re-autioned tasks 
  
 %%% Detail Results 
  
TaskNames = 1:InitNumberOfTask; 
% Calculate the profit using the clearing price (i.e. M_BuyBid)     
110 
SellerProfit1  = 0.5*(SellAndBuyWinnerBids(:,1)-
SellAndBuyWinnerBids(:,2) + TI_TaskCost - SellAndBuyWinnerBids(:,1) -( 
GS_jUAV_SBids-SellAndBuyWinnerBids(:,1))); 
BuyerProfit1 = SellerProfit1; 
OriginalGS_Profit = 0.5*(GS_jUAV_SBids - SellAndBuyWinnerBids(:,1)); % 
profit of original GS that was paired with the winner UAV 
  
AvgSellBid = mean(SellAndBuyWinnerBids(:,1)); 
AvgBuyBid = mean(SellAndBuyWinnerBids(:,2)); 
% AvgGS_DelivererBid = mean(GS_jUAV_SBids); 
AvgOriginalGS_Bid = mean(GS_jUAV_SBids); 
AllAvgBids = [AvgOriginalGS_Bid,AvgSellBid,AvgBuyBid]; 
  
AvgClearingPrice = mean(M_BuyBid); 
AvgOriginalGS_Profit = mean(OriginalGS_Profit); 
AvgSellProfit = mean(SellerProfit1); 
AvgBuyProfit = mean(BuyerProfit1); 
% AvgGS_DelivererProfit = mean(GS_Profit); 




% Compute the total profits for all GS 
  
GS_TotalProfits = zeros(NumberOfGS,1); 
GS_Names = 1:NumberOfGS; 
for g = 1:NumberOfGS 
    GS_Originalfrequency = find(OriginalGS==g); % how often GS 
originally paired with the winner UAV 
    GS_Sellfrequency = find(SellAndBuyWinners(:,1)==g); % how often GS 
got tasks delivered to it 
     
    if ~isempty(GS_Originalfrequency) 
    GS_TotalProfits(g) = GS_TotalProfits(g)+ 
sum(OriginalGS_Profit(GS_Originalfrequency));   
    end 
        if ~isempty(GS_Sellfrequency) 
    GS_TotalProfits(g) = GS_TotalProfits(g)+ 
sum(SellerProfit1(GS_Sellfrequency));   




% Compute the total for all UAVs 
  
UAV_TotalProfits = zeros(NumberOfUAVs,1); 
UAV_Names = 1:NumberOfUAVs; 
for u = 1:NumberOfUAVs 
    UAV_Buyfrequency = find(SellAndBuyWinners(:,2)==u); % how often UAV 
buys tasks from Winner GS 
    if ~isempty(UAV_Buyfrequency) 
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    UAV_TotalProfits(u) = UAV_TotalProfits(u)+ 
sum(BuyerProfit1(UAV_Buyfrequency));   




% Write the results into excel sheeet 
TITLE = {'TaskName','Creation Time(sec)','Auction 
Time(sec)','Deadline(sec)','Task Cost($) (from TI)', 'Original Seller 
Bid($)','Winning Seller Bid($)', 'Winning Buyer Bid($)',... 
    'Original_GS', 'Seller(GS)','Buyer(UAV)', 'Clearing Price($)', 




BuySellRecords = [TaskNames',TaskCreationTime',TaskAuctionTimesOld, 
AllTaskDeadlines,TI_TaskCost,GS_jUAV_SBids,SellAndBuyWinnerBids(:,1),Se
llAndBuyWinnerBids(:,2),... 

















































%Display the UAV tasklists 
% TimeHistory = zeros(NumberOfUAVs,4); %initialization 
GS_UAVRouteCordAll{NumberOfUAVs} = []; % initialization 
GS_UAVRouteCordAllTemp{NumberOfUAVs} = []; % initialization  to hold 
coordinates without UAV current locations 
UAVTasksCompletionDurations  = zeros(NumberOfUAVs,1); 
GS_UAVRoutesAll{NumberOfUAVs} = []; 
TaskCompletionTimes = []; 
TaskCompletionDists = []; 
 WinnerUAV_RouteNew =  WinnerUAV_Route; 
UAV_TaskList{NumberOfUAVsAll} = []; % initialization 
 WinnerUAV_Route{NumberOfUAVsAll} = []; 
 GS = 0; 
 DelayTimes = zeros(1,NumberOfUAVsAll); 
 DelayTimes(UAV_ID_Eliminate) = UAVRecoveryTime-UAV_Elimination_Time; 
 disp('RECORDS FOR UAVs WHICH WON REAUCTIONED TASK(S): ') 
 disp('(Note: Those UAVs which did not win any reacuctioned tasks have 
the same records as shown before)') 
 for UAVname=1:NumberOfUAVsAll 
    UAV_TaskList{UAVname} = [UAV_TaskListCompleted{UAVname}, 
UAV_TaskListNew{UAVname}]; 
    if ~isempty(WinnerUAV_RouteNew{UAVname}) 
        GS = WinnerUAV_RouteNew{UAVname}(end); 
    elseif ~isempty(WinnerUAV_RouteOld{UAVname}) 
        GS = WinnerUAV_RouteOld{UAVname}(end); 
    end 
    
    if ~isempty(UAV_TaskList{UAVname})&& 
~isempty(UAV_TaskListNew{UAVname}) 
        WinnerUAV_Route{UAVname} = [UAVname, 
UAV_TaskListCompleted{UAVname},WinnerUAV_RouteNew{UAVname}(2:end-
1),GS]; % from beginning to end 
        disp(strcat('UAV',num2str(UAVname),':')) 
        disp('TASKLIST:'),  
        disp('Task completed before REAUCTION:') 
        disp(UAV_TaskListCompleted{UAVname}) 
        disp('Task completed after REAUCTION:') 
        disp(UAV_TaskListNew{UAVname}) 
        disp('Minimum Route from start to end:'), 
disp(WinnerUAV_Route{UAVname}) % from start to after reauction 
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        disp('StartTime  DeliveryTime  PathTime LatestDeliveryTime') 
         
        DeliveryTime = round(ReauctionCloseTime) + 
round(WinnerPathTime(UAVname));  
%       DeliveryTime  = round(CycleAuctionCloseTime)+ 
round(WinnerPathTimeOld(UAVname))+ round(WinnerPathTime(UAVname)); 
        LatestDeliveryTime = 
min(AllTaskDeadlines(UAV_TaskList{UAVname})); 
        UAVPathTime =  round(WinnerPathTimeOld(UAVname))+ 
round(WinnerPathTime(UAVname)); % time taken by UAV from start to end 
        TimeHistory(UAVname,:) = 
round([CycleAuctionCloseTime(end),DeliveryTime, UAVPathTime, 
LatestDeliveryTime]); 
%          
  
%         DeliveryTime = 
round(TaskAuctionTimes(WinnerUAV_Route{UAVname}(2)))+ 
max(round(WinnerPathTime(UAVname)), round(WinnerPathTimeOld(UAVname)))+  
DelayTimes(UAVname); 
%         LatestDeliveryTime = 
min(AllTaskDeadlines(UAV_TaskList{UAVname})); 
%         UAVPathTime = DeliveryTime - 
round(TaskAuctionTimes(WinnerUAV_Route{UAVname}(2)))-
DelayTimes(UAVname); 
%         TimeHistory(UAVname,:) = 
round([TaskAuctionTimes(WinnerUAV_Route{UAVname}(2)),DeliveryTime, 
UAVPathTime, LatestDeliveryTime]); 
%          
         
        disp(TimeHistory(UAVname,:)) 
        GS_UAVRouteCordAll{UAVname} = 
[UAVs(UAVname,:);Task(UAV_TaskListCompleted{UAVname},:); 
UAVs_CurrentLocations(UAVname,:);... 
                                       
Task(WinnerUAV_RouteNew{UAVname}(2:end-1),:);GS_Cord(GS,:)]; 
         GS_UAVRouteCordAllTemp{UAVname} = 
[UAVs(UAVname,:);Task(UAV_TaskListCompleted{UAVname},:);... 
                                               
Task(WinnerUAV_RouteNew{UAVname}(2:end-1),:);GS_Cord(GS,:)]; 
        TaskNames = WinnerUAV_Route{UAVname}(2:end-1); 
        UAVTasksCompletionDurations(UAVname) = WinnerPathTime(UAVname); 
        GS_UAVRoutesAll{UAVname} = WinnerUAV_Route{UAVname}; 
        TaskCompletionTimes = [TaskCompletionTimes, 
WinnerPathTime(UAVname) + WinnerPathTimeOld(UAVname)]; 
        figure('Name', strcat('Robustness:  Path for executing task by 
UAV', num2str(UAVname))) 
        
plot3(GS_UAVRouteCordAll{UAVname}(:,1),GS_UAVRouteCordAll{UAVname}(:,2)
,GS_UAVRouteCordAll{UAVname}(:,3),'*-') 




        text(GS_UAVRouteCordAllTemp{UAVname}(2:end-
1,1),GS_UAVRouteCordAllTemp{UAVname}(2:end-
1,2),GS_UAVRouteCordAllTemp{UAVname}(2:end-1,3), num2str(TaskNames')) 
        
text(UAVs_CurrentLocations(UAVname,1),UAVs_CurrentLocations(UAVname,2),
UAVs_CurrentLocations(UAVname,3), strcat('UAV',num2str(UAVname))) 
        
text(GS_UAVRouteCordAll{UAVname}(end,1),GS_UAVRouteCordAll{UAVname}(end
,2),GS_UAVRouteCordAll{UAVname}(end,3), strcat('GS',num2str(GS))) 
        grid on 
        xlabel('x') 
        ylabel('y') 
        zlabel('z') 
    else 
  
         TaskCompletionTimes = [TaskCompletionTimes, 
WinnerPathTime(UAVname) + WinnerPathTimeOld(UAVname)]; 
    end 
 end 
  
TaskCompletionDists = UAV_Speed.*TaskCompletionTimes; 
% Display the GS and the UAVs  it solds tasks to 
for GS=1:NumberOfGS 
    if ~isempty(GS_UAVList{GS}) 
        disp(strcat('UAV LIST FOR GS',num2str(GS),':')) 
        disp(GS_UAVList{GS}) 
    end 
end 
  











function [UAV_Bid,UAV_Route,PathTime] = RouteOptimizer(UAV_TaskList, 
GS_Cord, GS_id, UAV_id, UAVs, Task,UAV_Speed,Task_Cost,... 
                                        
NewTask_id,DistUnitCost,TimeUnitCost,NewLeastPathTime,NewTaskDeadline,.
.. 




 global GS_UAVCommStrength 
 UAV_Bid = []; 
 UAV_Route =[]; 
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 PathTime = []; 
if ~isempty(UAV_TaskList) 
    PreviousLeastPathTime = NewLeastPathTime; 
    Task_Order = perms([UAV_TaskList,NewTask_id]); 
    [NumOfPath,NumOfCordPerPath] = size(Task_Order); 
    UAV_Path = [repmat(UAV_id,NumOfPath,1), 
Task_Order,repmat(GS_id,NumOfPath,1)]; 
     
    NumOfCordPerPath = NumOfCordPerPath + 2; 
    Path_Cost = []; 
    for m = 1:NumOfPath 
        Path_Dist(m,:)= 0; 
        UAV_Path_Cord = [UAVs(UAV_id,:); Task(Task_Order(m,:),:); 
GS_Cord(GS_id,:)]; 
        for n = 1:NumOfCordPerPath-1 
            Path_Dist(m,:) = Path_Dist(m,:) + 
norm(UAV_Path_Cord(n+1,:)-UAV_Path_Cord(n,:)); 
        end 
    end 
    Path_Dist = Path_Dist - 
GS_UAVCommStrength*(GS_CommRange+UAV_CommRange); 
    Path_Cost = Path_Dist*DistUnitCost; % in USD 
    PathTime = Path_Dist./UAV_Speed; % (in seconds) 
    PathTime_Cost =  PathTime *TimeUnitCost; % in USD 
     
   [Path_LeastCost,Path_Idx] =  min(Path_Cost + PathTime_Cost); 
   UAV_Route = UAV_Path(Path_Idx,:); 
   NewLeastPathTime = PathTime(Path_Idx,:);  
   PathTime =  NewLeastPathTime;  
   FirstTaskAuctionTime =  GSTaskAuctionedTimes(UAV_Route(2)); % the 
time at which the first task in that UAV task list is auctioned 
   UAV_BidCost = UAV_BidChecker(NewLeastPathTime, 
Task_Cost,PreviousLeastPathTime,NewTaskDeadline, 
FirstTaskAuctionTime,... 
       OldTaskDeadline,DistUnitCost,UAV_Speed,TimeUnitCost); 
    
  UAV_Bid = UAV_BidCost; 
elseif isempty(UAV_TaskList) 
  [UAV_Bid,PathTime] = UAV_LocalBid(GS_Cord,UAVs,GS_id, 
NewTask_id,Task,UAV_id,DistUnitCost,UAV_Speed,TimeUnitCost,GS_CommRange
,UAV_CommRange,NewTaskDeadline,TASK_auctionTime,GS_WinningCosts); 
  UAV_Route = [UAV_id,NewTask_id,GS_id]; 
end 
  
    
       
         
 
File 





    ,GS_Cord,GS_ID,UAV_id, UAVs,GS_CommRange,UAV_CommRange) 
  
UAV_ExtraTime = NewLeastPathTime - PreviousLeastPathTime; 
NewLeastPathDueTime = NewLeastPathTime+FirstTaskAuctionTime; % Expected 
time for UAV to deliver its tasks 
  
ExtraDistCost = UAV_ExtraTime*UAV_Speed*DistUnitCost; 
ExtraTimeCost =  UAV_ExtraTime*TimeUnitCost; 
UAV_CostCheck = ExtraDistCost + ExtraTimeCost; 
  
 UAVCommCheck = norm(UAVs(UAV_id,:)- GS_Cord(GS_ID,:)); % checking to 
see if UAV and GS are in communication range 
  
if (NewTaskDeadline<=OldTaskDeadline) &&(NewLeastPathDueTime<= 
NewTaskDeadline)&& (UAV_CostCheck<=Task_Cost(NewTask_id)) && 
UAVCommCheck <=(GS_CommRange + UAV_CommRange) 
% if (NewLeastPathDueTime<= OldTaskDeadline)&&(NewTaskDeadline<= 
OldTaskDeadline)&&(UAV_CostCheck>=Task_Cost(NewTask_id)) 
    UAV_BidCost = UAV_CostCheck; 
    PathTime = PathTime1; 
else 
    UAV_BidCost = Inf; 
    PathTime = Inf; 
end 
% [(NewTaskDeadline-OldTaskDeadline),(NewLeastPathDueTime-
NewTaskDeadline), (UAV_CostCheck-Task_Cost(NewTask_id)), (UAVCommCheck 








    ,GS_Cord,GS_ID,UAV_id, UAVs,GS_CommRange,UAV_CommRange) 
  
UAV_ExtraTime = NewLeastPathTime - PreviousLeastPathTime; 
NewLeastPathDueTime = NewLeastPathTime+FirstTaskAuctionTime; % Expected 
time for UAV to deliver its tasks 
  
ExtraDistCost = UAV_ExtraTime*UAV_Speed*DistUnitCost; 
ExtraTimeCost =  UAV_ExtraTime*TimeUnitCost; 
UAV_CostCheck = ExtraDistCost + ExtraTimeCost; 
  
 UAVCommCheck = norm(UAVs(UAV_id,:)- GS_Cord(GS_ID,:)); % checking to 
see if UAV and GS are in communication range 
  
117 
if (NewTaskDeadline<=OldTaskDeadline) &&(NewLeastPathDueTime<= 
NewTaskDeadline)&& (UAV_CostCheck<=Task_Cost(NewTask_id)) && 
UAVCommCheck <=(GS_CommRange + UAV_CommRange) 
% if (NewLeastPathDueTime<= OldTaskDeadline)&&(NewTaskDeadline<= 
OldTaskDeadline)&&(UAV_CostCheck>=Task_Cost(NewTask_id)) 
    UAV_BidCost = UAV_CostCheck; 
    PathTime = PathTime1; 
else 
    UAV_BidCost = Inf; 




NewTaskDeadline), (UAV_CostCheck-Task_Cost(NewTask_id)), (UAVCommCheck 




function [UAV_Cost,PathTime] = UAV_LocalBid(TI,UAVs,TI_id, 
Task_id,Task,UAV_id,DistUnitCost,UAV_Speed,... 




% This function computes the bid for UAV that communicates with a given 
GS 
% having a task list 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
global GS_UAVCommStrength 
UAV_Cost = []; 
PathTime = []; 
Alpha  = 0.5; 
% 
UAVCommCheck = norm(UAVs(UAV_id,:)- GS_Cord(GS_ID,:)); % checking to 
see if UAV and GS are in communication range 
if UAVCommCheck <=(GS_CommRange + UAV_CommRange) 
%      
    Dist = (norm(UAVs(UAV_id,:)-Task(Task_id,:)) + 
norm(Task(Task_id,:)-GS_Cord(GS_ID,:)))-(1-
GS_UAVCommStrength)*(GS_CommRange+UAV_CommRange); 
     
%     Dist = 2*norm(UAVs(UAV_id,:)-Task(Task_id,:)); 
    DistCost = Dist*DistUnitCost; 
    Time = Dist/UAV_Speed; 
    TimeCost = Time*TimeUnitCost; 
    Cost = DistCost + TimeCost; % measured in USD 
    if Time<=(NewTaskDeadline-TASK_auctionTimes(Task_id))&& 
Cost<=Task_Cost(Task_id) 
%         UAV_Cost = Alpha*Task_Cost(Task_id) + Cost*(1-Alpha); % the 
bid from UAV for  a task 
        PathTime = Time; 
        UAV_Cost = Cost; 
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    else 
        UAV_Cost = Inf; 
        PathTime = Inf; 
     end 
else 
    UAV_Cost =  Inf; 
    PathTime =  Inf; 









global Task UAVsAll GS_Cord GS_CommRange NumberOfGS TI_CommRange TI 
UAV_CommRange UAV_Speed WinnerUAV_RouteOld TangGS_CommRange 
GS_UAVCommStrength... 
DistUnitCost TimeUnitCost NumberOfUAVs GSTaskAuctionedTimes Up 
AuctionTimeStep TI_id TaskAuctionTimesOld WinnerPathTimeOld GS_UAVList 
UAVs 
 global SellAndBuyBids M_BuyBid SellAndBuyWinners SellAndBuyWinnerBids 
TI_TaskCost GS_jUAV_SBids InitNumberOfTask TaskCreationTime Scenario 
global TI_CostScalar CycleAuctionCloseTime Gamma OriginalUAV OriginalGS 
% load tasks from file 
   load('RandTasks_12') 
   Task = RandTasks; % Don't edit this line 
%  Task = load ('-ascii', 'TaskCord.DAT'); %// old 
%  %load randomized UAVs 
% load('RandUAVs'); % 10 set of initial UAVs location 
% SampleNumber = 1; % Choose from 1 through 10 
% UAVs = RandUAVs{SampleNumber}; 
     
TangGS_CommRange = 200; % radius when GSs are tangent to each other 
UAV_CommRange = 250;%750; %2500; %150; %2500; % 150, 250,750,1000,1500 
UAV_CommRangeMin = 250; 
Scenario = 2;   % 1 =>GSs Disjoint,  2 => GSs Overlapped, 3 => GSs at 
Tangency 
NumberOfUAVs = 9; 
UAV_Speed = 10; % in m/s 
GS_UAVCommStrength = 0.1;  % comm strength between GS and UAV. The 
bigger this number the weaker the communication 
GS_GS_CommStrength = 1; % comm strength between two GSs if they 
intersect 
% Note: (1)The bigger the communication radius, the stronger the 
% communication. (2) This value lies between 0 and 1 
  
Gamma = 0.002; % Note: Gamma is a fraction of latest delivery time of 
task by eliminated UAV 
% Cost constant 
DistUnitCost = 0.1; 
119 
TimeUnitCost = 0.1; 
Up = 1; 
InitNumberOfTask = size(Task,1); 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
  
% Initiator's Coordinates 
X_TI = 0; 
Y_TI = 0; 
Z_TI = 0; 
TI = [X_TI, Y_TI, Z_TI]; 




% Generate the Ground Stations (GS) 
NumberOfGS = 3; 
[GS_Cord, GS_CommRange,TI_CommRange] = CreateGroundStations(NumberOfGS, 
TI,TangGS_CommRange,Scenario, GS_GS_CommStrength); 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
disp(sprintf('Actual GS communication radius for the overlap case is: 
%s', num2str(GS_CommRange))) 
disp(sprintf('TI communication radius: %s', 
num2str(round(TI_CommRange)))) 
disp(sprintf('\n')) % print an empty space for clarity purposes 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
  
%Generate Randomized the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) such that each 
communicate 
% with at least two GS 
  
%  RandUAVs =  
GenerateRandUAVs(NumberOfGS,NumberOfUAVs,GS_Cord,TangGS_CommRange,UAV_C
ommRangeMin); 
% Note: comment the line above once you're satisfied with the initial 
randomized locations of the UAVs 
load(strcat(num2str(NumberOfUAVs),'RandUAVs_',num2str(UAV_CommRangeMin)
)) % don't edit this line 
UAVs = RandUAVs; % Don't edit this line 
  
%     %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
        
     
UAV_TaskList{NumberOfUAVs} =  []; % initialization 
GS_UAVList{NumberOfGS} =  []; % initialization 
SellAndBuyBids = []; 
SellAndBuyBidsLimit = []; 
TaskAuctionTimes = []; 
tH = []; 
AuctionTimeStep = 2; %in seconds 
DeadLineScalar = 10; % To give good estimation of the task's deadline 
TI_CostScalar = 1; % To give good estimation of the task's cost 
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TaskCreationTime = 0:AuctionTimeStep:(InitNumberOfTask-
1)*AuctionTimeStep;  % Task is created every 2 seconds 
UnsoldTaskIDs = 1:InitNumberOfTask;  % all tasks are unsold initially 
CycleCount = 0; 
SellAndBuyBids = zeros(InitNumberOfTask,2);% initialization for winning 
sell and buy bids pair 
GS_jUAV_SBids = zeros(InitNumberOfTask,1); % initialization 
M_BuyBid = zeros(InitNumberOfTask,1); % initialization 
SellAndBuyWinners = zeros(InitNumberOfTask,2); % initialization 
SellAndBuyWinnerBids = zeros(InitNumberOfTask,2); % initialization 
GS_TaskDelivered = zeros(InitNumberOfTask,1); % initialization 
WinnerUAV_Route{NumberOfUAVs} = []; % initialization 
WinnerPathTime = zeros(NumberOfUAVs,1); % initialization 
OriginalUAV = zeros(InitNumberOfTask,1); 
OriginalGS = zeros(InitNumberOfTask,1); 
tH_Original = DeadLineScalar*(sqrt(sum((bsxfun(@minus, TI, 
Task)).^2,2)))/UAV_Speed;% all original task deadlines 
while(1) 
CycleCount = CycleCount + 1; 
NumberOfTask(CycleCount) = length(UnsoldTaskIDs); 
UnsoldTaskIDsTemp = []; 




    TaskID = UnsoldTaskIDs(i); 
    if CycleCount>1 
        TaskAuctionTimes(TaskID) = i*AuctionTimeStep + 
CycleAuctionCloseTime(CycleCount-1); 
    else 
        TaskAuctionTimes(TaskID,:) =  TaskCreationTime(TaskID); 
    end 
    t =  TaskAuctionTimes(TaskID) - TaskCreationTime(TaskID);  % Time 
ellasped before task gets sold 
    tH(TaskID,:) = tH_Original(TaskID) + t; % Task deadline 
  
    %Compute the cost of the task to be auctioned 
    TI_Po(:,TaskID) = 2*(norm(TI-Task(TaskID,:))*DistUnitCost + 
norm(TI-Task(TaskID,:))*TimeUnitCost/UAV_Speed); % initial price from 
the task initiator 
    TI_TaskCost(TaskID,:) = TI_CostScalar*TI_Po(:,TaskID)*(1 + 
Up*t/tH_Original(TaskID)); 
    GS_Bids{TaskID} = GS_Bidding(NumberOfGS, TI, 
Task(TaskID,:),GS_Cord,TI_CommRange,GS_CommRange,UAV_Speed,DistUnitCost
,TimeUnitCost,TI_TaskCost,TaskID); % sell bids 
     
     
    %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
    %%% Compute the bids for the UAVs 
    UAVwinnerBids  = zeros(1,NumberOfGS); 
    WinnerUAVnames = zeros(1,NumberOfGS); 
    GSs_UAVs_BidPairs = zeros(NumberOfGS,4); 
    GSnames = 1:NumberOfGS; 
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    for gs = 1:NumberOfGS 
        UAV_BidsTemp = Inf*ones(1,NumberOfUAVs); % initialization 
        for k=1:NumberOfUAVs 
            if isempty(UAV_TaskList{k}) 
                UAV_TaskListPrevious = []; 
                NewLeastPathTime = 0; 
                OldTaskDeadline = 0; 
                oldGS_ID = 0; 
                
[UAV_Bids{TaskID}(k),GS(gs).UAV_Route{k},GS(gs).PathTime(k)] =  
UAV_Bidding(UAV_TaskListPrevious, TI, TI_id, k, UAVs, 
Task,UAV_Speed,TI_TaskCost,... 
                    
TaskID,DistUnitCost,TimeUnitCost,NewLeastPathTime,tH(TaskID),... 
                    OldTaskDeadline,GS_CommRange,UAV_CommRange, 
TaskAuctionTimes,GS_Cord,gs,oldGS_ID); 
            else 
                UAV_TaskListPrevious = UAV_TaskList{k}; 
                NewLeastPathTime = WinnerPathTime(k,:); 
                OldTaskDeadline = min(tH(UAV_TaskList{k}));    
%tH(GS(gs).UAV_Route{k}(end-1)); 
                oldGS_ID = WinnerUAV_Route{k}(end); 
                
[UAV_Bids{TaskID}(k),GS(gs).UAV_Route{k},GS(gs).PathTime(k)] =  
UAV_Bidding(UAV_TaskListPrevious, TI, TI_id, k, UAVs, 
Task,UAV_Speed,TI_TaskCost,... 
                    
TaskID,DistUnitCost,TimeUnitCost,NewLeastPathTime,tH(TaskID),... 
                    OldTaskDeadline,GS_CommRange,UAV_CommRange, 
TaskAuctionTimes,GS_Cord,gs,oldGS_ID); 
            end 
        end 
        %         UAV_Bids{TaskID} 
        [UAVwinnerBids(gs), WinnerUAVnames(gs)] = 
min(UAV_Bids{TaskID}); 
        UAV_BidsTemp(WinnerUAVnames(gs)) = UAVwinnerBids(gs); 
    end 
     
    GSs_UAVs_BidPairs = [GSnames',round(GS_Bids{TaskID}'), 
WinnerUAVnames',round(UAVwinnerBids')]; 
    disp('GSs and UAVs bid pairs:') 
    disp('           GS       GS_Bid       UAV      UAV_Bid') 
    disp(GSs_UAVs_BidPairs) 
    %       UAV_Bids{i} 
     
    
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
     
    % Matching the GS_Bids (i.e. sell bids) and the UAV_Bids (i.e. buy 
    % bids 
    Sell_in_Bids = []; 
    Buy_in_Bids  = []; 
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    TransactionSet = []; 
    UAV_Indx = []; 
    GS_Indx = []; 
    UAV_Indx1 = []; 
    GS_Indx1 = []; 
     
    % Determine eligible sellers and buyers 
    for m=1:NumberOfGS 
        if GS_Bids{TaskID}(m)~=Inf && UAVwinnerBids(m)~=Inf 
                    TransactionSet = [TransactionSet; 
[GS_Bids{TaskID}(m),UAVwinnerBids(m)]]; 
                    UAV_Indx1 = [UAV_Indx1; WinnerUAVnames(m)]; 
                    GS_Indx1 = [GS_Indx1; m]; 
                     
        end 
    end 
  
      %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
     
    NumOfSellers = size(TransactionSet,1);  
    if ~isempty(TransactionSet) % There are seller(s) and buyer(s) 
         
        [ignore1 OrigIndx] = min(TransactionSet(:,1)); 
        OriginalUAVtemp = UAV_Indx1(OrigIndx); 
        OriginalGStemp  = GS_Indx1(OrigIndx); 
         
        Rank = sort([TransactionSet(:,1), 
TransactionSet(:,2)],'ascend'); 
        M_BuyBid(TaskID,:) = Rank(NumOfSellers);  % Mth bid 
        M_nextBuyBid(TaskID,:) = Rank(NumOfSellers+1); % M+1st bid 
         
        [Sell_Bids{TaskID}, GS_IndxTemp{TaskID}] = 
min(TransactionSet(:,1)); 
        GS_Indx(1)  = GS_Indx1(GS_IndxTemp{TaskID}); % winner GS(i.e. 
GS with minimum bid) 
        UAV_Indx(1) = UAV_Indx1(GS_IndxTemp{TaskID});  % winner UAV 
(i.e. UAV with minimum bid) 
         
        Buy_Bids{TaskID} = TransactionSet(GS_IndxTemp{TaskID},2); 
%         GS_Winner = GS_Indx1(GS_IndxTemp{TaskID}); % actual winner 
        GS_jUAV_SBids(TaskID) = GS_Bids{TaskID}(GS_Indx(1)); % cost of 
GS to which task is supposed to be delivered 
        GS_TaskDelivered(TaskID) = GS_Indx(1); 
         
        %%%Determine the winner 
        UAV_TaskList{UAV_Indx(1)}    = [UAV_TaskList{UAV_Indx(1)}, 
TaskID]; 
        GS_UAVList{GS_Indx(1)}       = [GS_UAVList{GS_Indx(1)}, 
UAV_Indx(1)]; 
        WinnerUAV_Route{UAV_Indx(1)} = 
GS(GS_Indx(1)).UAV_Route{UAV_Indx(1)}; 
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        WinnerPathTime(UAV_Indx(1))  = 
GS(GS_Indx(1)).PathTime(UAV_Indx(1)); 
        SellAndBuyBids(TaskID,:)     = SellAndBuyWinnerBids(TaskID,:); 
%winning sell and buy bids pair 
        SellAndBuyWinners(TaskID,:) =  [GS_Indx(1), UAV_Indx(1)]; % 
UAVs and GSs that win the tasks 
        SellAndBuyWinnerBids(TaskID,:) = [Sell_Bids{TaskID}, 
Buy_Bids{TaskID}]; 
        SellAndBuyBids(TaskID,:) =     SellAndBuyWinnerBids(TaskID,:); 
         
        OriginalUAV(TaskID) = OriginalUAVtemp; % UAV with minimum cost 
        OriginalGS(TaskID)  = OriginalGStemp;  % GS paired with UAV 
with minimu cost 
    else % there are no sellers and/or buyers 
        UnsoldTaskIDsTemp = [UnsoldTaskIDsTemp,TaskID]; 
    end 
end 
TransactionSet = []; 
  
% Check if all tasks are sold 
if isempty(UnsoldTaskIDsTemp) 
            break; % break from the while loop 
else 
    UnsoldTaskIDs = UnsoldTaskIDsTemp; % tasks unsolds 
end 
%     UnsoldTaskIDs 
end 
  
 UAV_TaskList % without robustness 
TaskAuctionTimesOld = TaskAuctionTimes; 
WinnerPathTimeOld = WinnerPathTime; 
WinnerUAV_RouteOld = WinnerUAV_Route; 
TaskNames = 1:InitNumberOfTask; 
% Calculate the profit using the clearing price (i.e. M_BuyBid)     
SellerProfit1  = 0.5*(SellAndBuyWinnerBids(:,1)-
SellAndBuyWinnerBids(:,2) + TI_TaskCost - SellAndBuyWinnerBids(:,1) -( 
GS_jUAV_SBids-SellAndBuyWinnerBids(:,1))); % profit of GS to which task 
is delivered to 
BuyerProfit1   = SellerProfit1;  %profit of the winner UAV 
OriginalGS_Profit      = 0.5*(GS_jUAV_SBids - 
SellAndBuyWinnerBids(:,1)); % profit of original GS that was paired 
with the winner UAV 
  
AvgSellBid = mean(SellAndBuyWinnerBids(:,1)); 
AvgBuyBid = mean(SellAndBuyWinnerBids(:,2)); 
% AvgGS_DelivererBid = mean(GS_jUAV_SBids); 
AvgOriginalGS_Bid = mean(GS_jUAV_SBids); 
AllAvgBids = [AvgOriginalGS_Bid,AvgSellBid,AvgBuyBid]; 
  
AvgClearingPrice = mean(M_BuyBid); 
AvgOriginalGS_Profit = mean(OriginalGS_Profit); 
AvgSellProfit = mean(SellerProfit1); 
AvgBuyProfit = mean(BuyerProfit1); 
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% AvgGS_DelivererProfit = mean(GS_Profit); 




% Compute the total profits for all GS 
  
GS_TotalProfits = zeros(NumberOfGS,1); 
GS_Names = 1:NumberOfGS; 
for g = 1:NumberOfGS 
    GS_Originalfrequency = find(OriginalGS==g); % how often GS 
originally paired with the winner UAV 
    GS_Sellfrequency = find(SellAndBuyWinners(:,1)==g); % how often GS 
got tasks delivered to it 
     
    if ~isempty(GS_Originalfrequency) 
    GS_TotalProfits(g) = GS_TotalProfits(g)+ 
sum(OriginalGS_Profit(GS_Originalfrequency));   
    end 
        if ~isempty(GS_Sellfrequency) 
    GS_TotalProfits(g) = GS_TotalProfits(g)+ 
sum(SellerProfit1(GS_Sellfrequency));   






% Compute the total for all UAVs 
  
UAV_TotalProfits = zeros(NumberOfUAVs,1); 
UAV_Names = 1:NumberOfUAVs; 
for u = 1:NumberOfUAVs 
    UAV_Buyfrequency = find(SellAndBuyWinners(:,2)==u); % how often UAV 
buys tasks from Winner GS 
    if ~isempty(UAV_Buyfrequency) 
    UAV_TotalProfits(u) = UAV_TotalProfits(u)+ 
sum(BuyerProfit1(UAV_Buyfrequency));   





% Write the results into excel sheeet 
TITLE = {'TaskName','Creation Time(sec)','Auction 
Time(sec)','Deadline(sec)','Task Cost($) (from TI)', 'Original Seller 
Bid($)','Winning Seller Bid($)', 'Winning Buyer Bid($)',... 
    'Original_GS', 'Seller(GS)','Buyer(UAV)', 'Clearing Price($)', 

























SubTitle = {'GS', 'GS Total Profit($)'}; 













SubTitle = {'UAV', 'UAV Total Profit($)'}; 














disp('Ground Stations coordinates (in rows):') 
disp(round(GS_Cord)) 
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disp('UAVs Initial Coordinates (in rows):') 
disp(round(UAVs)) 
disp('Tasks coordinates (in rows):') 
disp(Task) 
  
%Display the UAV tasklists 
TimeHistory = zeros(NumberOfUAVs,4); %initialization 
GS_UAVRouteCordAll{NumberOfUAVs} = []; % initialization 
UAVTasksCompletionDurations  = zeros(NumberOfUAVs,1); 
GS_UAVRoutesAll{NumberOfUAVs} = []; 
TaskCompletionTimes = zeros(1,NumberOfUAVs); 
TaskCompletionDists = []; 
for UAVname=1:NumberOfUAVs 
    if ~isempty(UAV_TaskList{UAVname}) 
        disp(strcat('RECORDS FOR UAV',num2str(UAVname),':')) 
        disp('Tasklist:'), disp(UAV_TaskList{UAVname}) 
        disp('Minimum Route:'), disp(WinnerUAV_Route{UAVname}) 
        disp('StartTime  DeliveryTime  PathTime LatestDeliveryTime') 
        DeliveryTime = round(CycleAuctionCloseTime(end))+ 
round(WinnerPathTime(UAVname)); 
        LatestDeliveryTime = min(tH(UAV_TaskList{UAVname})); 
        TimeHistory(UAVname,:) = 
round([CycleAuctionCloseTime(end),DeliveryTime, 
WinnerPathTime(UAVname), LatestDeliveryTime]); 
        disp(TimeHistory(UAVname,:)) 
        GS_UAVRouteCordAll{UAVname} = 
[UAVs(UAVname,:);Task(WinnerUAV_Route{UAVname}(2:end-1),:); 
GS_Cord(WinnerUAV_Route{UAVname}(end),:)]; 
        TaskNames = WinnerUAV_Route{UAVname}(2:end-1); 
        UAVTasksCompletionDurations(UAVname) = WinnerPathTime(UAVname); 
        GS_UAVRoutesAll{UAVname} = WinnerUAV_Route{UAVname}; 
        TaskCompletionTimes(UAVname) = WinnerPathTime(UAVname); 
        figure('Name', strcat('Path for executing task by UAV', 
num2str(UAVname))) 
        
plot3(GS_UAVRouteCordAll{UAVname}(:,1),GS_UAVRouteCordAll{UAVname}(:,2)
,GS_UAVRouteCordAll{UAVname}(:,3),'*-') 
        
text(GS_UAVRouteCordAll{UAVname}(1,1),GS_UAVRouteCordAll{UAVname}(1,2),
GS_UAVRouteCordAll{UAVname}(1,3), strcat('UAV',num2str(UAVname))) 
        text(GS_UAVRouteCordAll{UAVname}(2:end-
1,1),GS_UAVRouteCordAll{UAVname}(2:end-
1,2),GS_UAVRouteCordAll{UAVname}(2:end-1,3), num2str(TaskNames')) 




        grid on 
        xlabel('x') 
        ylabel('y') 
        zlabel('z') 




TaskCompletionDists = UAV_Speed.*TaskCompletionTimes; 
% Display the GS and the UAVs  it solds tasks to 
for GS=1:NumberOfGS 
    if ~isempty(GS_UAVList{GS}) 
        disp(strcat('UAV LIST FOR GS',num2str(GS),':')) 
        disp(GS_UAVList{GS}) 
    end 
end 
  
% TaskCompletionTimesNew = [TaskCompletionTimes,zeros(1, NumberOfUAVs-
length(TaskCompletionTimes))]; 
% TaskCompletionDists = UAV_Speed.*TaskCompletionTimesNew; 
  








%  % Running the robustness 
 % Inputs required from the user: 
 disp(sprintf('\n')) 
 disp(sprintf('\n')) 
 disp('RESULTS FROM THE ROBUSTNESS') 
 UAV_ID_Eliminate = 1;  
 UAV_Elimination_Time = 50;  
 UAVRecoveryTime = 4400;  
 Robustness(UAV_ID_Eliminate, UAV_Elimination_Time, UAVRecoveryTime, 
GS_UAVRoutesAll,... 
















NumberOfRoutes = length(GS_UAVRoutesAll); 
  
for k =1:NegoTimeStep:DurationForNegotiation % first 3 seconds 
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        for i=1:NumberOfRoutes 
            RoutesIDs = 1:NumberOfRoutes; 
            RoutesIDs(find(RoutesIDs==i))=[]; % avoid self-negotiation 
            UAVNegPath{i} = []; 
            PathCostNeg(i) = inf; 
            %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
             
            DistTravel_UAVi = CalUAVDistance(UAV_Speed, 
TimeHistory(i,1),k); 
             
            [UAVNewLocation(i,:),UAVi_MovingTo] = 
FindUAVnewLocation(UAVCumRouteLenghts{i}, GS_UAVRouteCordAll{i}, 
RouteLenghts{i},DistTravel_UAVi); 
             
            UAVNegPath = []; PathCostNeg = []; 
            for kk=1:length(RoutesIDs) 
                j = RoutesIDs(kk); 
                UAVNegPath{j} = []; 
                 
            DistTravel_UAVj = CalUAVDistance(UAV_Speed, 
TimeHistory(kk,1),k); 
            [UAVNewLocation(j,:),UAVj_MovingTo, LastTaskDone] = 
FindUAVnewLocation(UAVCumRouteLenghts{j}, GS_UAVRouteCordAll{j}, 
RouteLenghts{j},DistTravel_UAVj); 
        NegoCommCheck = norm(UAVNewLocation(i,:)-UAVNewLocation(j,:)); 
% UAVs new locations used 
        if (NegoCommCheck <= (UAV_CommRange 
+UAV_CommRange))&&(length(RouteLenghts{i})>2&& 
length(RouteLenghts{j})>2) % UAVs in comm range 
             
%             disp('Communicate') 
            [UAVNegPath{j},PathCostNeg(j)] = 
CalUAVsNegBids(DistTravel_UAVi,UAVi_MovingTo,... 
                                     
UAVj_MovingTo,GS_UAVRouteCordAll{i},GS_UAVRouteCordAll{j},UAVNewLocatio
n(i,:),... 
                        
UAVNewLocation(j,:),DistUnitCost,TimeUnitCost,UAV_Speed,TimeHistory,j,D
eadlines,GS_UAVRoutesAll{i}); 
        else 
            UAVNegPath{j} = []; 
            PathCostNeg(j) = inf; 
        end 
            end 
            %%%% Determine the winner from the negotiation 
            [ignore, NegWinner]= min(PathCostNeg); 
            if PathCostNeg~=inf 
                GS_UAVRouteCordAll{NegWinner} = UAVNegPath{NegWinner}; 
% winner route updated by adding a task coordinate 
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                GS_UAVRoutesAll{NegWinner}= 
[GS_UAVRoutesAll{NegWinner}(1:UAVj_MovingTo-
1),TaskName,GS_UAVRoutesAll{NegWinner}(UAVj_MovingTo:end)]; 
                 
                GS_UAVRouteCordAll{i}(UAVi_MovingTo,:) = []; % delete 
the task coordinate from tasklist 
                GS_UAVRoutesAll{i}(UAVi_MovingTo) = []; % delete the 
task id from tasklist 
                 
                % Uspdate the segmental lengths 
                [RouteLenghts{NegWinner},CumRouteLenghts{NegWinner}] = 
ComputeSegmentDistance(GS_UAVRouteCordAll{NegWinner},GS_UAVRoutesAll{Ne
gWinner}); 
                [RouteLenghts{i},CumRouteLenghts{i}] = 
ComputeSegmentDistance(GS_UAVRouteCordAll{i},GS_UAVRoutesAll{i}); 
           
            end 
        end 
end 
         
   UAV_GSRoutesNeg =    GS_UAVRoutesAll; 
   UAV_GSRoutesCordNeg  = GS_UAVRouteCordAll; 
    






% This function plots the routes for the UAVs 
figure('Name',strcat('Ground Station',num2str(GS_ID))) 
COLORS = ['r';'b';'g';'y';'k';'m';'c']; 
  
for i = 1: length(UAVRouteCord) 
    UAVRouteCord{i} =real(UAVRouteCord{i}); 
    if i<length(COLORS)+1 
    
plot3(UAVRouteCord{i}(:,1),UAVRouteCord{i}(:,2),UAVRouteCord{i}(:,3),st
rcat(COLORS(i),'o-')) 
    
text(UAVRouteCord{i}(1,1),UAVRouteCord{i}(1,2),UAVRouteCord{i}(1,3),str
cat('UAV',num2str(UAVsNames(UAVs_Route{i}(1,1))))) 
    
text(UAVRouteCord{i}(end,1),UAVRouteCord{i}(end,2),UAVRouteCord{i}(end,
3),'GS') 
    hold on 
    else 




    
text(UAVRouteCord{i}(1,1),UAVRouteCord{i}(1,2),UAVRouteCord{i}(1,3), 
strcat('UAV',num2str(UAVsNames(UAVs_Route{i}(1,1))))) 
    
text(UAVRouteCord{i}(end,1),UAVRouteCord{i}(end,2),UAVRouteCord{i}(end,
3),'GS') 
    hold on 
    end     
end 
grid on 
hold off 
 
